CROSSING BOUNDARIES: A GROUNDED THEORY OF THE CONCURRENCE OF JURISDICTION  BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MOLEO AND OTHER  ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS IN THE ADJUDICATION OF  ADMINISTRATIVE CASES by DUMPILO, Eric Anthony Ateniao
CROSSING BOUNDARIES: 
A GROUNDED THEORY OF THE CONCURRENCE OF JURISDICTION 
BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MOLEO AND OTHER 
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS IN THE ADJUDICATION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
DUMPILO Eric Anthony Ateniao 
September, 2014 
 
 
 
Thesis Presented to the Higher Degree Committee 
of Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION POLICY 
 
 
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 The plethora of inspiration, encouragement and support drawn from a 
multitude of individuals, institutions and organizations enabled the completion 
this research. 
 Many thanks to the Japanese Grant Aid for Human Resource Development 
Scholarship (JDS) for giving me the entitlements needed to sustain and finance 
the accomplishment of this study. 
 To my supervisor, Prof. Yamagami Susumu, whose patience I have tested 
time and time again, and whose sense of perspective kept me leveled when 
everything else seemed to fall apart, you have always had my highest respect and 
admiration, I am much obliged. 
 To Prof. Robert ―Bob‖ Salazar and Prof. Francisco ―Jun‖ Fellizar, Jr., your 
valuable inputs and informed judgments guided my thinking process, words are 
not enough to express my gratitude, I tip my hat. 
 To my colleagues and confidantes, Atty. Conrado Estreller, Jr., Atty. 
Maria Crisanta Cudiamat, and Francis Rodriguez, your assistance and reassuring 
gestures are beyond measure, I am indebted to your selflessness ad infinitum. 
 To my fellow researchers, Maj. Mayra Tulauan and Michelle De Guzman-
Ariola, with whom I have shared moments of laughter, cheer, and endless 
yakiniku‘s and karaoke‘s, thank you very much. 
 Finally, to my family and friends, thank you for all your invaluable 
support, you all have caused this experience to be enriching and meaningful.  
 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....................................................................................ii 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................ vi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................vii 
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................... viii 
DECLARATION ..................................................................................................... x 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 1 
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND .............................................................................. 6 
2.1 Ombudsman, defined ..................................................................................... 6 
2.2 History of the Ombudsman ............................................................................ 6 
2.3 The Philippine Ombudsman, beginnings ....................................................... 8 
2.4 The Office of the Ombudsman, a briefer ..................................................... 13 
2.4.1 The Office of the Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law 
Enforcement Offices ....................................................................................... 17 
2.4.2 Administrative Adjudication ................................................................. 20 
2.4.3 Jurisdiction of the OMB-MOLEO ......................................................... 25 
2.5 The Concurrence of Jurisdiction in Administrative Adjudication ............... 26 
2.5 Administrative Cases in the OMB-MOLEO, a status .................................. 29 
2.6 Summary ...................................................................................................... 32 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................... 33 
3.1 Research Questions and Objectives ............................................................. 33 
3.2 The Grounding of Theory in This Study ...................................................... 35 
3.3 Concentration of the Study ........................................................................... 36 
3.4 The Process of the Study and the Researcher‘s Role ................................... 38 
3.5 Data Sources ................................................................................................. 39 
3.5.1 The Primary Data Sources ..................................................................... 40 
3.5.2 The Secondary Data Sources ................................................................. 41 
3.5.3 Focused Informant Interviews ............................................................... 41 
 
iv 
3.6 The Coding Process...................................................................................... 42 
3.7 Grounded Theory, a Discussion ................................................................... 46 
3.7.1 The Interpretive Method in Grounded Theory ...................................... 50 
3.7.2 Quality of the Grounded Theory ........................................................... 52 
3.7.3 The Indications for Fit ........................................................................... 54 
3.8 Summary ...................................................................................................... 55 
CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL CATEGORIES ................................................... 57 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 57 
4.2 Monitoring.................................................................................................... 58 
4.2.1 Lack of Human Resources ..................................................................... 58 
4.2.2 Non-implementation .............................................................................. 61 
4.2.3 Lack of Data .......................................................................................... 62 
4.2.4 Impact .................................................................................................... 63 
4.3 Coordination ................................................................................................. 65 
4.3.1 Clogging of Case Dockets ..................................................................... 65 
4.3.2 Infringement of Power ........................................................................... 67 
4.3.3 Conflicting Decisions ............................................................................ 69 
4.3.4 Verification ............................................................................................ 71 
4.4 Consistency .................................................................................................. 73 
4.4.1 Borrowed Rules of Procedure ............................................................... 74 
4.4.2 Discretion .............................................................................................. 78 
4.5 Summary ...................................................................................................... 80 
CHAPTER 5: LITERATURE ............................................................................... 82 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 82 
5.2 Concurrence in Jurisdiction.......................................................................... 83 
5.3 The Theoretical Categories .......................................................................... 88 
5.3.1 Monitoring ............................................................................................. 88 
5.3.2 Coordination .......................................................................................... 91 
5.3.3 Consistency ............................................................................................ 95 
5.4 Political Systems Theory and Institutionalism ........................................... 106 
CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS ............................................... 111 
 
v 
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 111 
6.2 Hypotheses ................................................................................................. 111 
6.3 Theoretical Framework .............................................................................. 113 
6.4 Monitoring.................................................................................................. 114 
6.5 Coordination ............................................................................................... 116 
6.6 Consistency ................................................................................................ 117 
6.7 The Theoretical Variable............................................................................ 118 
6.8 The Crossing of Boundaries ....................................................................... 119 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 122 
7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 122 
7.2 Limitations ................................................................................................. 122 
7.3 Implications of this research ...................................................................... 123 
7.4 Suggestions for further research ................................................................. 124 
7.5 Personal Reflections ................................................................................... 126 
Appendix 1 Subcategory Development: Lack of Technical human resources .. 128 
Appendix 2 Subcategory Development: Non-implementation ......................... 128 
Appendix 3 Subcategory Development: Lack of data ....................................... 129 
Appendix 4 Subcategory Development: Impact ................................................ 129 
Appendix 5 Subcategory Development: Clogging of Case Dockets ................. 129 
Appendix 6 Subcategory Development: Infringement of Power ...................... 130 
Appendix 7 Subcategory Development: Conflicting Decisions ........................ 130 
Appendix 8 Subcategory Development: Verification ....................................... 131 
Appendix 9 Subcategory Development: Borrowed Rules of Procedure ........... 131 
Appendix 10 Subcategory Development: Discretion ...................................... 132 
Appendix 11 Category Development: Monitoring .......................................... 133 
Appendix 12 Category Development: Coordination ....................................... 134 
Appendix 13 Category Development: Consistency ......................................... 135 
Appendix 14 Theory Generation ..................................................................... 136 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................ 137 
 
 
vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 2.4 Organizational Structure of the Office of the Ombudsman ................. 17 
Figure 2..4.1 Organizational Structure of the OMB-MOLEO ............................... 19 
Figure 2.4.2 The Process of Administrative Adjudication .................................... 24 
Figure 2.5 Concurrence of Jurisdiction  ................................................................. 29 
Figure 2.5.a Administrative Adjudication in the OMB-MOLEO .......................... 30 
Figure 2.5.b CIPAAB Administrative Case workload for CY 2012 ..................... 31 
Figure 2.5.c Resolved Administrative Cases for CY 2012 .................................... 31 
Figure 3.6 The Coding Process .............................................................................. 46 
Figure 6.3 Theoretical Framework ...................................................................... 114 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CSC   Civil Service Commission 
CIPAAB Criminal Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative 
Adjudication Bureau 
 
CNFS   Certification of Non-Forum Shopping 
DRP   Disciplinary Rules of Procedure 
GIPO   Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer 
IAS   Internal Affairs Service 
MOA   Memorandum of Agreement 
MOU   Memorandum of Understanding 
OMB   Office of the Ombudsman 
OMB-MOLEO Office of the Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law 
Enforcement Offices 
 
PNP   Philippine National Police 
RA   Republic Act 
RRACCS  Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study aimed to understand the issues surrounding the concurrence of 
jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law 
Enforcement Offices with the administrative tribunals of other law enforcement 
offices in the adjudication of administrative cases. By exploring the perceptions of 
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officers who handle administrative cases, the 
character and quality of the phenomenon is discerned.  
 As the research design, this study employed the blueprints of ground 
theory. The study involved information gathering through five focused interviews 
with Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officers of the OMB-MOLEO. The 
findings were conceptualized and coded. The information they have provided 
were analyzed through constant comparative analysis, where three theoretical 
categories: monitoring, coordination, and consistency, were developed around the 
core theoretical variable of crossing boundaries. 
 The first theoretical category of monitoring posits that there is no active 
measure to ascertain the observance and execution of the decisions issued by the 
OMB-MOLEO in administrative cases. The second theoretical category of 
coordination postulates that the coordination of actions and the steps taken to 
ensure the timeliness of administrative proceedings enhances the sustainability 
and constancy of decisions being issued in these administrative processes. The 
third theoretical category suggests that the incongruous decisions from different 
 
ix 
adjudicating bodies and within the organization itself, where the likeliness of its 
occurrence must not be ignored, can nevertheless be prevented. 
 This study finds that the theory of crossing boundaries attempts to protect 
the integrity of individual institutions while at the same time, realizing the unity 
and oneness of policies, processes and procedures. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This introduction explains the raison d'être and the extent to which the 
study would examine the efficiency of the procedure on administrative 
adjudication by and between the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military and 
Other Law Enforcement Offices and the other administrative tribunals exercising 
adjudications on administrative cases with respect to the concurrence in their 
jurisdiction.  
Over the past few years, the OMB-MOLEO and the other administrative 
adjudicating bodies, with particular reference to the Internal Affairs Service of the 
Philippine National Police, have been experiencing a continued increase of 
administrative suits being initiated against officers and employees of the different 
law enforcement offices. This ongoing surge of legal actions necessitates the 
demand for speedy, constant and sustainable decisions, coupled with the need to 
explicate on the venue for initiating these legal actions. Since variations in the 
dispensation of decisions ultimately develop from the concurrence of jurisdiction 
to hear and decide these cases, there is a need to revisit the effectiveness of the 
regulations defining the relationship between the OMB-MOLEO and the 
adjudicating bodies of law enforcement offices. 
Prompted by the aspiration to mold a modern administrative system that 
could provide citizens with an institution which enjoys their confidence and to 
which they can have easy access for the redress of their grievances (Jha, n.d.), 
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many countries in recent decades adopted the institution of the Ombudsman. In 
the Philippines, the Ombudsman, otherwise known as the Tanodbayan, is a 
constitutional authority created under the mandate of the Philippine Constitution 
of 1987. It is the main governmental agency that fights corruption in public 
services (The Ombudsman Act, 1989). It provides the people with better and 
dependable public services by liberating them from injustices and 
maladministration. Under its corruption enforcement strategy, the main objective 
of the Office of the Ombudsman is to ensure that both the general laws of the state 
and its corruption laws are enforced throughout the country.  
To implement its objectives, the Office of the Ombudsman has been 
divided into sectors to properly define its jurisdiction (Office of the Ombudsman, 
2011). One of these sectoral offices is the Office of the Ombudsman for the 
Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices, which has jurisdiction over officials 
and personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine National Police, 
Bureau of Fire Protection, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Bureau of 
Corrections, and the other agencies of the government that are involved in law 
enforcement (MC No. 02, 2003). Of the two main functions of each sector, the 
adjudication of administrative cases (AO No. 07, 1990) is the primordial subject 
of this study. It is a key feature to note, however, that the law enforcement offices 
under the Ombudsman‘s jurisdiction, the PNP for example, has also established 
their own adjudicating body that concurs with the OMB-MOLEO‘s administrative 
disciplinary jurisdiction (Philippine National Police, 2007).  This doctrine of 
concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject 
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matter. This doctrine is further strengthened by the settled rule that the body or 
agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to 
the exclusion of the others (Department of Justice et al., vs. Liwag, et al., 2005). 
It is from the nexus of this concomitant interaction that policy statements 
on inter-agency relations, more particularly that of concurrence of jurisdiction, 
have been devised. These policies are implemented to control and monitor the 
collective acts of the OMB-MOLEO and the different adjudicating bodies of law 
enforcement offices. These individual governmental institutions work together to 
restrict the prevalence of graft and corrupt practices in the system of government 
by imposing sanctions to erring public officers and employees, thereby saving the 
people from injustices, maladministration and providing them with better and 
accountable public services.  
To this end, there is a need to look into the competency of the collective 
efforts of the OMB-MOLEO and the other adjudicating bodies, with particular 
reference to the PNP-IAS, and determine the effectiveness of the regulations 
defining their relationship, thus, this thesis explores concurrence of jurisdiction of 
the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement 
Offices (OMB-MOLEO) with other administrative tribunals in the adjudication of 
administrative cases. 
This research draws on the approaches designed in grounded theory to 
discover the influences and dynamics that are in play with regard to the 
concurrence of jurisdiction in the adjudication of administrative cases. As it stands 
in the case of a grounded theory research, the orientation of this research is toward 
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building a theory. This study proposes theory that is rooted in facts and data based 
on the arguments and premises that emerged from discussions with Graft 
Investigation and Prosecution Officers (GIPOs) of the OMB-MOLEO.  
A historical overview of the Ombudsman as an institution and a primer on 
the Office of the Ombudsman in the Philippines is provided in chapter two. The 
background is meant to acquaint the reader to the nature and functions of the 
Office of the Ombudsman. The research question and objectives of the research 
are presented after the history and brief introduction of the Office of the 
Ombudsman so that the contexts from which the questions have stemmed from 
would be better understood.  
Primed from the outline presented in the second chapter, the third chapter 
unveils the research objectives. The third chapter also delivers a synopsis of 
grounded theory as a research method. The chapter likewise demonstrates that the 
three general standards in grounded theory are satisfied. First, that the theory 
‗fitted‘ closely with the topic and the area of the study‘s discipline; second, the 
theory is both explicable and functional to the actors in the field of study; and 
third, that the theory is multifaceted that it pairs off largely with the adaptations in 
the area of study. 
Chapter four offers samples and specimens of the data that has accrued for 
the duration of the research. The fourth chapter correspondingly reveals the 
theoretical categories that have emerged. Through inductive and deductive 
reasoning, the creation of theoretical categories was made possible by the constant 
comparative approach within grounded theory. This process is central to the 
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attempt of the researcher to move toward the sphere of theory development from 
the world of practice. Three theoretical categories became apparent in the course 
of analyzing the data through the employment of the constant comparative 
approach. The theoretical categories are: monitoring, coordination and 
consistency. 
The nodes that link the theoretical categories in the study and what is 
attendant in the available bodies of research literature are created in the fifth 
chapter. Establishing the review of literature following the completion of the 
information-gathering in grounded theory is meant to keep the researcher from 
deriving suppositions, inferences and assumptions regarding the answers to the 
research questions or objectives in advance. 
The sixth chapter presents the substantial theory or the core theoretical 
variable regarding the concurrence of jurisdiction in the adjudication of 
administrative cases. The theory suggests that the crossing of boundaries means 
the alignment of certain aspects of procedures between and among the players in 
the field of administrative adjudication. The configurations, patterns and designs 
defining the relationship of the different adjudicating bodies form bridges that 
conjoin one tribunal to another in terms of policies and guidelines.  
The seventh chapter culminates the study by ruminating over the 
limitations to the research, the inferences of the study, and the promising 
prospective directions for research in this area. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Ombudsman, defined 
Broadly, the term Ombudsman is described as an official of the 
government who is tasked to investigate the complaints against the government or 
its functionaries. The Ombudsman has also been labeled – on the basis of his 
functions – as a public defender, a grievance man, a watchman over the law's 
watchmen, voice of the citizen, and citizen's counselor. Essentially, the 
Ombudsman protects citizens against injustices committed by civil officials 
(Office of the Ombudsman). Originally, the ombudsman was a public official who 
investigated, and in some instances, even prosecuted allegations of misfeasance or 
malfeasance by other governmental officials (Howard, 2010). 
 
2.2 History of the Ombudsman 
In order to be acquainted with and recognize the distinct features of 
present day ombudsman institutions, that of the Philippines in particular, there is a 
need to review the history of the ombudsman.  
The chronicles established in 16th century Sweden points out that the early 
beginnings of the ombudsman as an institution can be credited to King Charles 
XII.  It was said that King Charles XII has created a body to oversee his kingdom 
while he was away fighting wars for the country. An official with the title of 
Hogsta Ombudsman or ―Supreme Royal Ombudsman‖ was appointed in the year 
1713 (Office of the Ombudsman). The Hogsta Ombudsman was assigned to "keep 
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an eye‖ on royal officials and supervise observance of the laws (Osorio & 
Vicente, 2002). Sometimes the Hogsta Ombudsman was even commissioned to 
represent the king in some official functions (Office of the Ombudsman). 
Although some author-historians differ on the idea that the founding of the 
Ombudsman institution by the King Charles XII in 1713 is considered to be the 
grandsire of the Ombudsman institutions – apparently because of its intimate 
association with the executive branch of government and not being as self-
governing as it is designed to be – the ombudsman founded in the year 1713 
undeniably played a momentous role to the evolution of the Ombudsman concept 
(Orton, 2001). The strong monarchy under the leadership of King Charles became 
vulnerable after his death in November 1718. The parliament, on the other hand, 
grew congruently strong. As a result of this escalation, in the year 1917, the 
Hogsta Ombudsman was rechristened the Chancellor of Justice or 
Justitiekanslern. As an institution of Parliament, the Chancellor of Justice was 
extricated from the King‘s influence. However, the King again became absolute 
ruler in the latter part of the 18th century and as such, the ombudsman reverted to 
its being associated with the executive branch of government.  
In the Swedish constitutional reform of 1809, the 'High Ombudsman' was 
established. He is a high legal officer elected by the Parliament. His duty is to 
oversee the legitimacy and lawfulness of the Government‘s activities  (Soderman, 
1996). This Parliamentary Ombudsman of Sweden called Justitieombudsmannen, 
a designation which lightly translates as 'representative of the people' or ‗citizen's 
defender,' is a new independent institution of Parliament. It is remarkable to note 
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that even after more than 200 years, this 1809 institution is still an active and 
well-functioning institution in Swedish society. Hardly ever applying its initial 
function as a prosecutor and conveying offenders before the courts, the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman of Sweden now keeps public servants organized and 
aligned through assessments and its critique in particularized cases, assisting other 
agencies and institutions with valuable guidance and exemplifications of good 
governance (Orton, 2001). 
Since 1809, this institution has been espoused in many governments 
around the world. Private industries, like banking and insurance, have similarly 
adopted the concept of the Ombudsman. It can be observed, however, that the role 
of the Ombudsman has considerably changed. The contemporary Ombudsman‘s 
function is not to represent the agency or governmental entity being complained 
of, nor does the present-day Ombudsman act on any person‘s behalf just like a 
conventional attorney would do, rather, an Ombudsman acts in an impartial and 
independent way. This is true in the case of the Philippines. 
 
2.3 The Philippine Ombudsman, beginnings 
The present Office of the Ombudsman may be considered to have 
succeeded the Permanent Commission that was established in the Philippines‘ 
Revolutionary Government of 1898. The Revolutionary Government of the 
Philippines was instated in the Decree of June 23, 1898. The Decree likewise, 
under Article 21, provided for the creation of a Permanent Commission that would 
decide, in an appellate authority, petitions for the review of criminal case 
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judgments issued by provincial councils. The Vice President of the Republic 
presides over this Permanent Commission. The cases decided by the Permanent 
Commission were those that were filed against the Secretaries of the different 
Departments, including the officials of the provincial and municipal governments.  
After the ratification of the Constitution of 1899, popularly known as the 
Malolos Constitution, not only had the Permanent Commission continued its 
existence, but its authorities had also been magnified. Spreading the span of the 
Permanent Commission‘s powers, the Malolos Constitution, in No. 1, Article 55, 
provides that the Permanent Commission is given the power to "declare if there is 
sufficient cause to proceed against the President of the Republic, the 
Representatives, Department Secretaries, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
and the Solicitor General in the cases provided by the Constitution (Office of the 
Ombudsman).‖ 
By the same token, the creation of agencies to handle cases of corruption 
in the government service has been provided for by succeeding administrations. In 
the year 1950, for instance, President Quirino created an Integrity Board. In the 
year 1957, immediately upon assumption to office, President Magsaysay created 
the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission. In the year 1958, President 
Garcia introduced the Presidential Committee on Administration Performance 
Efficiency.  In the year 1962, President Macapagal inducted a Presidential Anti-
Graft Committee. A Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations 
was initiated by President Marcos in the year 1966.  
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The enactment of Republic Act No. 6028 in the year 1969 created the 
Office of the Citizen's Counselor. However, like the previous corruption 
prevention agencies established by past administrations, the Office of the Citizen's 
Counselor mainly conducts fact-finding investigations and issues recommendatory 
assessments to the legislature and the executive. Unfortunately, the provisions of 
RA No. 6028 were not at all implemented. Consequently, in the year 1970 
President Marcos pioneered a Complaints and Investigation Office and in the 
following year, the Presidential Administrative Assistance Committee.  
Sections 5 and 6 of Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provided for the 
creation of a special court known as the Sandiganbayan and an Office of the 
Ombudsman, known as the Tanodbayan. To effectively carry out these provisions, 
the head of state issued Presidential Decree Nos. 1486 and 1487 on June 11, 1978 
which formally created the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan, respectively (Office 
of the Ombudsman). 
To demarcate the powers and functions of the Tanodbayan, Presidential 
Decree No. 1487 and its subsequent amendments provided that the Tanodbayan 
shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including those 
in government-owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate 
recommendations, and in appropriate cases, file and prosecute criminal, civil or 
administrative cases before the proper court or body. On the other hand, the 
Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving 
graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers 
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and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations 
(Office of the Ombudsman).  
After the People Power Revolution, the framers of the 1987 Constitution 
envisioned the Ombudsman as an official critic who studies the laws, procedures 
and practices in government, a mobilizer who ensures that the steady flow of 
services is accorded to the citizens, and a watchdog who looks at the general and 
specific performance of all government officials and employees (Journal No. 40, 
July 26, 1986, p. 432). To further strengthen and insulate the Office of the 
Ombudsman from politics and pressure forces, the Constitution made it a fiscally 
autonomous body (Sec. 14, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution), independent from any 
other branch of government, and headed by an Ombudsman with a fixed term of 
seven years, who could be removed from office only by way of impeachment 
(Sec. 2, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution). The Ombudsman and his Deputies enjoy the 
rank of Chairman and members, respectively, of a Constitutional Commission 
whose appointments require no Congressional confirmation (Secs. 9 and 10, Art. 
XI, 1987 Constitution) (Office of the Ombudsman).  
The clear intent is to give full and unimpeded play to the exercise by said 
Office of its extraordinary range of oversight and investigative authority over the 
actions of all public officials and employees, offices and agencies. Not only can it 
investigate on its own or on complaint any official act or omission that appears to 
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient; it can prod officials into performing or 
expediting any act or duty required by law; stop, prevent and control any abuse or 
impropriety in the performance of such duties; require the submission of 
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documents relative to contracts, disbursements, and financial transactions of 
government officials for the purpose of ferreting out any irregularities therein 
(Sec. 13, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution). The conferment of this extensive authority 
is prefaced in the Constitution with the bestowal upon the Ombudsman and his 
deputies of the appealing title of "Protectors of the People" (Sec. 12, Art. XI) 
(Office of the Ombudsman).  
On July 24, 1987, Executive Order No. 243 was issued by President 
Corazon C. Aquino declaring the effectivity of the creation of the Office and 
restating its composition, powers and functions. On May 12, 1988, the Office of 
the Ombudsman became operational upon the appointment of the Ombudsman 
and his Overall Deputy Ombudsman. Immediately thereafter, one Deputy 
Ombudsman each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao were likewise appointed by 
the President. This date became the basis for celebrating the anniversary of the 
Office of the Ombudsman (Office of the Ombudsman).  
The Congress enacted on November 17, 1989, Republic Act No. 6770, 
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, providing for the functional and 
structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman and delineating its 
powers, functions and duties. Indeed, Congress, in enacting Republic Act 6770, 
sought to have an Ombudsman who would be an effective and an activist 
watchman vesting the Ombudsman with adequate authority that would prevent the 
Ombudsman from being a "toothless tiger" (Journal, Session No. 15, August 17, 
1988) (Office of the Ombudsman). 
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2.4 The Office of the Ombudsman, a briefer 
―A public office is a public trust. Public officers must at all times 
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost 
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism 
and justice and live modest lives.‖  
(Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution)  
 
As provided for under Article XI, Section 12, of the 1987 Philippine 
Constitution, the Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall 
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or 
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality 
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in 
appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result 
thereof. 
Further, under Section XI, Article 13 of the same Constitution, the Office of 
the Ombudsman is vested with the following powers, functions, and duties: 
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission 
of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or 
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. 
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or 
employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or 
instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled 
corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty 
required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety 
in the performance of duties. 
3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public 
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, 
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. 
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4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such 
limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of 
documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office 
involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report 
any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action. 
5. Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary 
in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, 
pertinent records and documents. 
6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so 
warrant and with due prudence. 
7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and 
corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their 
elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency. 
8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or 
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law. 
 
From the foregoing provisions under the Philippine Constitution, and 
having been conferred with the authority and title as the protector of the people, 
the Office of the Ombudsman performs distinct roles in guarding against 
injustices or maladministration. These roles can be condensed into five (5) major 
genres to include, to wit:  
 a Watchdog 
 a Mobilizer 
 an Official Critic 
 a Dispenser of Justice; and 
 an Equalizer 
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As a Watchdog, the Office of the Ombudsman superintends the 
performance of official functions, whether general or specific, to the end that laws 
are properly administered and observed. To be a Mobilizer means that the Office 
of the Ombudsman implements tactical measures to ensure the delivery of steady 
and efficient basic services. This role also encompasses the mobilization of citizen 
support activities to actively denounce graft and corrupt practices in the 
government. In its Official Critic role, the Office of the Ombudsman studies and 
evaluates existing laws, procedures and practices in the government with the end 
view of refining them. To faithfully carry out the role as a Dispenser of Justice, 
the Office of the Ombudsman imposes administrative sanctions on erring 
government officials and employees and prosecutes them in court for criminal 
offenses. Finally, in acting as an Equalizer, the Office of the Ombudsman 
recognizes and distinguishes the difference between the Rights of a Person and the 
Powers of the State.  
To succeed in achieving the yields aimed by the roles accorded to the 
Office of the Ombudsman, the office is tasked to perform the following functions, 
to wit: 
 Investigation 
 Prosecution 
 Administrative adjudication 
 Public assistance; and 
 Graft prevention 
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In its investigative function, the Office of the Ombudsman exercises 
unique prerogatives. Not only does the Office of the Ombudsman conduct 
preliminary investigation of cases filed before it, but also, it has the authority to 
initiate the conduct of fact-finding investigations and the gathering of evidence 
that is necessary for case build-up. The prosecutorial function of the Office of the 
Ombudsman is generally assigned to the Office of the Special Prosecutor which is 
delegated to prosecute cases that are filed before the special anti-graft court, the 
Sandiganbayan. For the regular courts, i.e. the Municipal Trial Court and Regional 
Trial Courts, the City Prosecutors are deputized by the Office of the Ombudsman 
to handle the prosecution. With regard to administrative adjudication, the 
imposition of administrative penalties against officers in the public service who 
are found guilty of an administrative offense is a power vested with the Office of 
the Ombudsman. These administrative sanctions may range from suspension to 
dismissal from the service. As a preventive measure against corruption, the Office 
of the Ombudsman extends public assistance to secure a smooth and satisfactory 
delivery of governmental services. Public assistance is intended to obviate the 
need for grease money and influence peddling for government actions. Graft 
prevention is a pro-active approach intended to eliminate opportunities to commit 
or pre-empt the commission of graft and corruption.  
In order to operate effectively and having been commissioned to perform 
the roles and functions for the entire government force throughout the country, the 
Office of the Ombudsman has been divided into sectors based on strategic and 
functional geographical settings. Thus, the Office of the Ombudsman is 
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fragmented into six sectoral offices, namely, the Ombudsman Central Office, the 
Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon, The Office of the Ombudsman for the 
Visayas, The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, The Office of the Special 
Prosecutor, and the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law 
Enforcement Offices. Each of these specific offices perform the roles and 
functions that are detailed by the constitution and as reinforced in the Office of the 
Ombudsman‘s founding law, with the exception of the Office of the Special 
Prosecutor which is a specialized body composed by Prosecutors who appear in 
the anti-graft court in representation of the government and its interests. A simple 
organizational structure of the Office of the Ombudsman is presented below: 
Figure 2.4 Organizational Structure of the Office of the Ombudsman 
 
2.4.1 The Office of the Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law 
Enforcement Offices 
 
The Office of the Ombudsman is charged with monumental tasks that have 
been generally categorized into investigatory power, prosecutorial power, 
authority to inquire and obtain information, public assistance, and the function to 
implement, institute and adopt preventive measures. In order to ensure the 
 
18 
effectiveness of his constitutional role, the Ombudsman was provided with an 
over-all deputy as well as a deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. 
However, well into the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, a 
provision for the appointment of a separate deputy for the military establishment 
was necessitated by Commissioner Ople's lament against the rise within the armed 
forces of "fraternal associations outside the chain of command" which have 
become the common soldiers' "informal grievance machinery" against injustice, 
corruption and neglect in the uniformed service, thus, in the words of 
Commissioner Ople:
1
 
―In our own Philippine Armed Forces, there has arisen in 
recent years a type of fraternal association outside the chain of 
command proposing reformist objectives. They constitute, in fact, 
an informal grievance machinery against injustices to the rank and 
file soldiery and perceive graft in higher rank and neglect of the 
needs of troops in combat zones. The Reform of the Armed Forces 
Movement of RAM has kept precincts for pushing logistics to the 
field, the implied accusation being that most of the resources are 
used up in Manila instead of sent to soldiers in the field. The 
Guardians, the El Diablo and other organizations dominated by 
enlisted men function, more or less, as grievance collectors and as 
mutual aid societies. 
This proposed amendment merely seeks to extend the office 
of the Ombudsman to the military establishment, just as it 
champions the common people against bureaucratic indifference. 
The Ombudsman can designate a deputy to help the ordinary foot 
soldier get through with his grievance to higher authorities. This 
                                                          
1
 Blas F. Ople was a member of the Constitutional Commission (Con Com) that drafted the 1987 
Philippine Constitution. 
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deputy will of course work in close cooperation with the Minister 
of National Defense because of the necessity to maintain the 
integrity of the chain of command. Ordinary soldiers, when they 
know they can turn to a military Ombudsman for their complaints, 
may not have to fall back on their own informal devices to obtain 
redress for their grievances. The Ombudsman will help raise troop 
morale in accordance with a major professed goal of the President 
and the military authorities themselves. x x x‖ 
 
The add-on now forms part of Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Philippine 
Constitution which reads as follows: 
―Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the 
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as 
Tanodbayan, one over-all Deputy and at least one Deputy each for 
Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. A separate deputy for the military 
establishment shall likewise be appointed.‖ (Emphasis supplied) 
 
The organizational structure of the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military and 
Other Law Enforcement Offices is presented below: 
 
 
Figure 2.4.1 Organizational Structure of the Office of the 
Ombudsman - MOLEO 
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2.4.2 Administrative Adjudication 
 To better understand the terms and processes discussed in this research, let 
us begin with the basics. As a citizen of the Philippines, two liabilities attach for 
the commission or omission of any act affecting the rights, liberties and properties 
of people whether natural or juridical. These are the criminal and civil liabilities. 
As provided for under Article 100 of the Philippine Revised Penal Code, every 
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Criminal liabilities arise 
from violations of the Revised Penal Code and Special Penal Laws – Acts enacted 
by the Philippine Legislature that punishes offenses or omissions, while civil 
liabilities arise from violations of the Civil Code of the Philippines.  
 For public officers or those that work for any of the government‘s 
institutions, another liability attaches. This liability is known as administrative 
liability. The allowance for an administrative liability is in consonance with the 
constitutional directive that a public official is reposed with public trust and 
accordingly, that they are obligated to be answerable to the people constantly. 
This 3-fold liability, i.e. criminal, civil, and administrative, is one of the peculiar 
characteristics of holding a public office.   
 A public officer‘s administrative liabilities are defined by and treated 
under Republic Act No. 6713 or otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and 
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Moreover, the Civil Service 
Commission, as a body constitutionally mandated to promote morale, efficiency, 
integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the Philippine Civil 
Service, promulgated the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil 
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Service on November 18, 2011. The Code of Conduct and the Revised Rules on 
Administrative Cases are the primary tools employed by the Office of the 
Ombudsman in the discharge of its Administrative Adjudicatory function. 
 Likewise, the administrative adjudicatory function of the Office of the 
Ombudsman is evident under Section 19 of RA 6713, which states that the 
Ombudsman shall act on any administrative complaint relating, but not limited to 
acts or omissions which: 
1) are contrary to law or regulation;  
2) are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; 
3) are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, 
though in accordance with law; 
4) proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of 
facts; 
5) are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper 
purpose; or 
6) are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification. 
  
In the adjudication of administrative cases, it is worthy to note that in these 
proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, 
the allegations in the complaint.  Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.  The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is a 
reasonable ground to believe that the person indicted was responsible for the 
alleged wrongdoing or misconduct. Be it noted that in finding for the presence of 
substantial evidence, there is neither a hard and fast rule nor a quantitative 
regulation in determining the degree or extent of evidence substantial enough to 
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produce an appropriate pronouncement. The determination of the manifestation 
and existence of substantial evidence rests solely at the discretion and sound 
judgment of the deciding body. 
 As a deciding body, the OMB-MOLEO has a total of 20 Graft 
Investigation and Prosecution Officers (GIPOs). The GIPOs are the OMB-
MOLEO‘s functional arm in the conduct of its Administrative Adjudication 
function. As well, the GIPOs are performing their functions under the Criminal 
Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative Adjudication Bureau (CIPAAB). 
 The process of administrative adjudication in the OMB-MOLEO 
commences when a written complaint is filed against an officer of any of the 
government agencies and offices under the OMB-MOLEO‘s jurisdiction. The 
complaint must be sufficient in form – should be subscribed and sworn to before 
any person authorized to administer oath and must contain a Certificate Against 
Forum Shopping – for it to be assigned a case docket number, otherwise, the 
complaint is forwarded to the Fact-Finding and Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of the 
OMB-MOLEO so that the necessary arrangements could be prepared or that 
certain defects in the complaint may perhaps be settled. When the complaint has 
been assigned a case docket number, the complaint now formally becomes an 
―Ombudsman case‖ such that the details in the complaint, i.e. the names of the 
complainant (the person complaining) and the respondent (the person being 
complained of), the offense charged, the office and designation of the respondent, 
and the case docket number, are entered into the office database. As an 
Ombudsman case, the same is assigned to a handling lawyer, the GIPO, through a 
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process called ―raffle.‖ The raffling of cases is as literal as the term can be. A 
GIPO cannot choose to handle a specific case, nor can a GIPO inhibit himself 
from handling a case, save for the exceptional circumstances of filial affiliation or 
personal association with any of the parties to the controversy.  
 Once a case has been raffled and delegated, the handling lawyer assigned 
to the case issues an Order for the respondent to file his counter-affidavit and the 
statements of his witnesses, if there be any, within the reglementary period as 
provided for by the rules. The Order further instructs the respondent to furnish the 
complainant of a copy of his counter-affidavit. At the election of the complainant, 
he may file his reply to the respondent‘s counter-affidavit and the respondent is 
also not precluded from filing his rejoinder to the complainant‘s reply should he 
wish to do so. These documents – the counter-affidavit, reply, and rejoinder – are 
also called collectively known as pleadings.  
 After the pleadings have been received, the handling lawyer once again 
issues an Order for the parties to file their respective Verified Position Papers. The 
position papers are required for the disposition of every administrative case in the 
OMB-MOLEO and the Office of the Ombudsman as a whole. The receipts by the 
handling lawyer of the position papers indicate that the case is already ‗ripe‘ for 
decision. 
 Collating all the pleadings, the GIPO must now prepare a draft of the 
Decision. A Decision is the pronouncement issued in every administrative case. 
All Decisions must contain a recital of the facts, the parties‘ arguments and 
defenses, a statement of the issue or issues involved, and finally, the decision. If a 
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GIPO finds that the allegations in the complaint together with its accompanying 
pieces of evidence is not substantial enough to procure a pronouncement of 
culpability, then the case is dismissed. However, once the GIPO determines that 
the allegations in the complaint, as against the defenses in the counter-affidavit, 
are supported by substantial evidence, then the respondent would be held guilty of 
the administrative offense charged and would therefore be meted with the 
appropriate penalty. The draft Decision has to be approved by higher authorities, 
and once concurred to and approved by the latter, a copy of the Decision is issued 
to the parties to the case. If a Decision is issued penalizing the respondent for the 
commission of an administrative offense, another copy of that Decision is issued 
to the implementing office or the agency where the respondent works under, for 
proper disposition and compliance. 
 The process of administrative adjudication could best be expressed 
through the figure below: 
Figure 2.4.2 The process of Administrative Adjudication 
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2.4.3 Jurisdiction of the OMB-MOLEO 
 Ombudsman Memorandum Circular No. 02-03 issued on October 29, 
2003, clarifies the scope of the OMB-MOLEO‘s jurisdiction. Under MC No. 02-
03, officers and employees of the following government agencies and offices are 
under the jurisdiction of the OMB-MOLEO: 
 Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its service units; 
 Philippine National Police (PNP); 
 Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP); 
 Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP); 
 Bureau of Corrections; 
 Philippine Coast Guard; and 
 All civilian employees of the above agencies 
 
In addition to the above enumeration, the following officers and personnel 
who hold offices within the National Capital Region and Luzon shall likewise be 
under the jurisdiction of OMB-MOLEO: 
1. Port and Airport Police; 
2. Traffic  enforcers (and other personnel with the same function) of the 
Department of Public Safety  and Traffic Management (DPSTM) and 
other similar traffic offices of cities and municipalities; 
3. Officials and employees of the National Police Commission 
(NAPOLCOM); 
4. Custom Police/Customs Investigation Intelligence Service (CIIS); 
5. Officers and personnel of City or Municipal jails; 
6. Land Transportation Office (LTO) ―Flying Squad‖;  
7. Immigration Officers, Intelligence Officers/Agents/Aides, Investigation 
Agents, and Law Enforcement Evaluation Officers of the Bureau of 
Immigration and Deportation (BID); and 
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8. All other uniformed officers and personnel detailed at civilian offices. 
 
Finally, OMB-MOLEO shall have jurisdiction over Metro Manila 
Development Authority (MMDA) Traffic Enforcers. 
As can be noted from the above enumeration, the OMB-MOLEO exercises 
jurisdiction on all military and law enforcement officers irrespective of their 
location, where they are situated, or their area of assignment. This jurisdiction 
includes the seven thousand one hundred and seven islands of the Philippine 
Archipelago.  
 
2.5 The Concurrence of Jurisdiction in Administrative Adjudication 
 Concurrence means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. 
Jurisdiction, as used in this study, simply means the authority to hear and decide 
cases. The doctrine then of concurrence of jurisdiction means that two or more 
administrative adjudicating bodies have the ability to hear and decide 
administrative cases evenly or in equal footing. This does not mean however, that 
the adjudication of a single administrative case may be proceeded to at the same 
time by different adjudicating bodies. To contain this very wide exercise of 
administrative power, the Philippine Supreme Court has settled the rule that in the 
concurrence of jurisdiction in administrative adjudication, the body or agency that 
first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion 
of the others. Otherwise stated, when a complaint is lodged before any one of the 
agencies concerned in administrative adjudication, the same complaint may not 
anymore be filed with the other agencies exercising concurrent jurisdiction.  
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 Having settled that the OMB-MOLEO conducts administrative 
adjudication on cases against the officials and personnel of law enforcement 
offices that fall under its jurisdiction, it is a key feature to declare as well that the 
military and other law enforcement offices have their own adjudicating bodies 
established within and functions in the confines of their offices. The adjudicating 
bodies of these law enforcement offices maintain concurrent jurisdiction with the 
OMB-MOLEO. For instance, the Philippine National Police (PNP) has an 
administrative adjudicatory body known as the Internal Affairs Service (PNP-
IAS). The PNP-IAS carries out its administrative adjudicatory function by virtue 
of Memorandum Circular No. 2007-001 or more popularly known as the 2007 
PNP Disciplinary Rules of Procedure. Explicitly, MC No. 2007-001 
acknowledges the OMB-MOLEO and PNP-IAS‘ concurrence of jurisdiction on 
administrative cases, thus on Section 3:  
―SEC. 3. Prohibition against Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of 
Complaints. – To avoid multiplicity of cases for the same cause of 
action, the complainant shall certify under oath in his pleading, or 
in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed 
therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertaking: 
a. That the complainant has not filed or commenced any 
complaint involving the same cause of action in any 
other disciplinary authority, IAS or Office of the 
Ombudsman; 
b. That to the best of the complainant‘s knowledge, no 
such complaint is pending before any other disciplinary 
authority, IAS or Office of the Ombudsman; 
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c. That if there is any such complaint which is either 
pending or may have been terminated, the complainant 
must state the status thereof; and 
d. That if the complainant shall thereafter learn that a 
similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending 
before any other police disciplinary authority, IAS or 
Office of the Ombudsman, the complainant must report 
such fact within five days from knowledge.‖ (Emphasis 
supplied) 
 
But then again, it has been noted, even so by previous Philippine 
Ombudsmen, that with this type of system, the investigation of the errant actions 
of public officials has time and again taken such a long time to be resolved that 
the public‘s attention, involvement, and awareness vanishes over time and the 
cases are consequently reduce in importance so they turn out to be extraneous and 
trivial to the life of people (Marcelo, 2004). Moreover, critics view this 
concurrence of jurisdiction as having the attributes of redundancy, since by now, 
the line agencies have prevailing procedures and processes that regulate and 
control the qualification of persons to hold public office; and these prevailing 
processes are in accord with the policies and rules of the Civil Service 
Commission (Roque, 2010). With these thrusts come the issues on uniformity and 
workability of the decisions made on administrative cases. 
The disapproving notions on the concurrence in jurisdiction by critics and 
bureaucrats alike, greatly deviate from the widely accepted wisdom that 
maladministration and corruption have the biggest impact on the quality of 
administration, and that an indifferent attitude in areas that concern people in their 
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day to day affairs results in non-delivery of public services and mediocre quality 
of decisions (Jha, n.d.). To this end, there is a need to look into the competency of 
the collective efforts of the OMB-MOLEO and the other administrative 
adjudicating tribunals and determine the effectiveness of the regulations defining 
their relationship.  
Please refer to the figure below for an illustration of the concurrence in 
jurisdiction: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Concurrence in jurisdiction in the adjudication of administrative cases  
 
 
2.5 Administrative Cases in the OMB-MOLEO, a status 
 Culled from the Annual Report of the OMB-MOLEO for the year 2012, a 
total of 922 administrative cases have been received for that calendar year. This 
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922 figure, when added to the previous year‘s (2011) 1,486 pending cases or those 
administrative cases that have still to be decided, add up to a total of 2,408 
pendent administrative cases. For that same year, however, the GIPOs of CIPAAB 
has adjudicated a total of 1,266 administrative cases. This leaves a total of 1,182 
administrative cases undecided as of the end of the year 2012. Please refer to the 
snapshots of OMB-MOLEO‘s 2012 Annual Report below: 
 
 
Figure 2.5.a Adminsitrative Adjudication in the OMB-MOLEO 
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Figure 2.5.b CIPAAB Administrative Case Workload for CY 2012 
 
 
Figure 2.5.c Resolved Administrative Cases for CY 2012 
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2.6 Summary 
 The Office of the Ombudsman is the main governmental agency that fights 
corruption in public services. Its jurisdiction to investigate graft and corrupt 
practices is conferred by law and one of its primordial functions is the 
adjudication of administrative cases. The Office of the Ombudsman for the 
Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices is one of the five sectoral offices 
upon which the Office of the Ombudsman is subdivided into. In line with the onus 
of OMB-MOLEO as an administrative disciplinary body, concurrent jurisdiction 
over administrative cases is shared with other administrative adjudicatory entities 
of the offices functioning under its clout of authority. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Research Questions and Objectives 
 
 The specific research methodology employed in a study is primarily based 
on the physiognomies of the research question or research objective. The 
particular approach to be used in any branch of interpretative inquiry varies with 
the desired end product (Stern P. , 1992). As the guiding instrument in the conduct 
of this thesis and in order for this study to focus on the issues of greatest concern, 
the navigational research question was: what are the hallmarks influencing the 
jurisdictional dynamics between the OMB-MOLEO and the other administrative 
adjudicatory bodies in the adjudication of administrative cases? To this end, the 
general objectives were: 
 To characterize the state of OMB-MOLEO‘s administrative 
adjudicatory functions. 
 To describe the goals and objectives of the tribunals exercising 
concurrent jurisdiction in the adjudication of administrative cases. 
 To identify vital issues concerning the decisions rendered or 
adjudications issued and delivered by the OMB-MOLEO on 
administrative cases under concurrent jurisdiction. 
 To define and establish desirable policy amendments or 
modifications that would be essential for the OMB-MOLEO to 
enhance the effective dispensation of administrative decisions. 
 
 The research question and objectives were derived from the researcher‘s 
own familiarity, experience, knowledge, and involvement in the adjudication of 
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administrative cases. As a Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer functioning 
under the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement 
Agencies, the researcher had ready access to data and materials, and the means to 
collaborate customarily with other GIPOs of the OMB-MOLEO. The researcher‘s 
personal experience within the sector has encouraged him to contribute to the 
generation and dissemination of ideas to other GIPOs within the OMB-MOLEO 
and to the Office of the Ombudsman in general. 
 As it would appear, and so as the public perceives, delays in the issuance 
of decisions in administrative cases and the redundancy in the exercise of 
jurisdiction have become the more common issues faced by GIPOs of OMB-
MOLEO. Even though these issues are commonplace, there is no general 
construction about how the delay and redundancy issues were understood or what 
these concerns meant to those handling administrative cases. The researcher 
believes that the ways in which the GIPOs comprehend their specialized 
circumstances and conditions can be described and conceptualized through a 
grounded theory. As the theory would frame the conceptual elements that are 
tapped from the common perceptions, insights or acuities of the GIPOs of the 
OMB-MOLEO, such a theory would be of benefit to the Office of the 
Ombudsman.   
 Inquiries into the concurrence of jurisdiction in administrative cases 
involving the Office of the Ombudsman and other adjudicatory bodies have been 
extremely limited. An extensive literature base or theoretical framework regarding 
the concurrence of jurisdiction in administrative cases involving the Office of the 
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Ombudsman and other adjudicatory bodies does not exist. Grounded theory is an 
appropriate methodology for this study because it permits for the composition of 
theory in this grey area where a limited number of scholarly works exists from 
which to derive any bearing. What this lack of research suggests is that a sizeable 
scale of domains needs further exploration.  
 As has been perceived by political critics and observers, the hulking 
matters of delay in the issuance of Decisions and redundancy in jurisdiction 
remain unaddressed. Resolving these points at issue would necessitate one to be 
au fait with the disciplines covered by the literature and probing on the subjects 
would proceed beyond the impelling causes for the GIPOs to issue the decisions 
they have authored. The limited number of specific resources available validates 
the dearth of a literature base for the concurrence of jurisdiction in administrative 
adjudications by the OMB-MOLEO. Thus, it is an ideal approach to generate a 
theory on the concurrence of jurisdiction in administrative adjudications through a 
grounded theory inquiry. With this theory, this study aims to augment the body of 
knowledge in the matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in the adjudication of 
administrative cases in the Office of the Ombudsman for the MOLEO. 
 
3.2 The Grounding of Theory in This Study 
 To better understand the social process (Bartell, 1995) affecting the 
decisions issued by the OMB-MOLEO in the adjudication of administrative cases, 
the grounding of theory should be tailored to the definition of the problem or 
research concentration, the process of the study with regard to data collection and 
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analysis, the researcher‘s role, and the research outcome and conclusions. Each of 
these four areas had a specific contribution to make in this research. The nexus 
between these research areas is presented in the following sections. 
 
3.3 Concentration of the Study 
 An investigation into the factors affecting the GIPOs‘ decisions in the 
adjudication of administrative cases with particular emphasis on the concurrence 
of jurisdiction could best be conducted through grounded theory. Grounded theory 
offers an appropriate avenue to know how the GIPOs of the OMB-MOELO 
comprehend the realm of shared jurisdiction, and how they attune themselves in 
the sphere of administrative adjudication.  
Strikingly, the researches and academic studies conducted that touches 
upon the Office of the Ombudsman emphasize on numerical assessments, 
empirical investigations that include case studies and surveys, the citation of legal 
precedents, comparative studies, and an assortment of other quantitative 
approaches. The main considerations of this body of literature are: 
 corruption and anti-corruption measures (e.g. Bardhan, 1997; Moran, 
1999; Quah, 1997; Villaroman, 2010; Angeles, 1999; Martinez, 2004; 
Batalla, 2001; Moratalla, 2000; Guerrero, 1987; Bhargava, 1999; 
Education, 2005; Mayo-Anda, 2010; Bolongaita, 2010; Nocos, 2010), 
 ethics (e.g. Gilman & Lewis, 1996; Gonzales, 2011; Rodriguez, 1991), 
 strengthening measures (e.g. Carmona, 2011), 
 accountability (e.g. Carmona, 2001; Carmona, Brillantes & Tiu Sonco, 
2012); 
 performance measures (e.g. Marin & Jones, 2011; Pangalangan, 2007), 
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 human rights (e.g. Rief, 2004), 
 comparative studies with Ombudsman institutions from other countries 
(e.g. Bolongaita, 2010; Quah, 2009; Quah, 2004; Quah, 2003). 
 
These research concentrations are likely to be expected and relatively 
unsurprising since they form the groundwork of common concerns identified by 
decision makers or international organizations. Grounded theory offers an 
opportunity for a research that varies and steers past the expression of these issues 
and affairs in empirical ways. What is apparent from the previous research or 
academic studies conducted concerning the Office of the Ombudsman is that these 
studies concentrate on the panoramic characteristics of the Office of the 
Ombudsman. None of these studies have been directed on the intramural 
processes and activities of the Office of the Ombudsman, particularly those that 
involve the conduct of one of the corruption prevention measures, i.e. 
administrative adjudication. While it is true that the studies which put figures on 
performance measures and the papers that gauge the results of counter-corruption 
measures are indispensable, it is also worth noting that an exploration on the 
mechanisms that bring about these results should not to be neglected. The 
technicalities involved in the operations of the Office of the Ombudsman are as 
much important and needs to be probed.  
In this light, grounded theory bids a very different research perspective 
and approach to the circumstances and conditions that are conventional and 
relatable to those performing authoritative and decisive functions such as in the 
adjudication of administrative cases. 
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3.4 The Process of the Study and the Researcher’s Role 
 In grounded theory, the researcher can be regarded as an adjuvant, such 
that the researcher facilitates – thereby affecting – the research process and he 
himself is induced or affected by the interactions, exchanges, and associations 
proceeding from the research (Seel, 2006). Compared to some branches of 
interpretative research, the researcher acts more of a catalyst where ―the 
researcher manipulates the circumstances, affects changes and then withdraws 
unchanged at the completion of the procedures‖ (Bartell, 1995). The social, 
organizational or psychological processes that are fundamental to social life are 
pursued by a grounded theory researcher in his role as an adjuvant (Charmaz, 
1994). Intrinsically, the detection or observance of these fundamental social 
processes precipitates concerns about the naivety of researchers untrained in the 
facets of sociology (Piantanida, Tannis, & Grubs, 2004). Then again, Charmaz 
(1994) clinches these impressions by asserting that the processes being observed 
hinge on the researcher‘s trainings and interests. In essence, this denotes that the 
processes taking place at the socio-organizational level are viewed through the 
enlightening aperture of the researcher‘s training and research interests.  
 The execution and realization of the research process was guided by the 
researcher‘s day-to-day work, along with his involvement in the interviews and 
conversations throughout the progression of this research. The process also 
outstretched his knowledge and enriched his scholarly background as a researcher 
and as a GIPO in the OMB-MOLEO. The detection and identification of coherent 
categories and the carving of the emergent grounded theory by sculpting the 
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articulations and observations of the participants was made feasible by the 
researcher‘s background and awareness. Ultimately, submitting himself as a 
collaborator in this study heightened the researcher‘s own stance on how GIPOs 
discharge their duties and functions. 
 Considering that the dynamics of the phenomena being investigated and 
the research process itself are encountered concomitantly (Bartell, 1995), 
grounded theory‘s framework of continuous and simultaneous collecting, coding, 
and analysis espouses an across-the-board experience for the researcher. Both 
qualitative and quantitative methods of data gathering have been employed in this 
research. It was ensured however, that in the use of both methods, the focus was 
on the process rather than the unit (Bartell, 1995). 
 
3.5 Data Sources 
 Data emanated from a number of sources during the research. The primary 
sources of data are constrained to the accounts and narratives in the focused 
interviews with GIPOs and the additional interviews conducted validating the 
saturation of theoretical conceptualizations. Certain fragments of ambiguity in the 
data collected from the focused interviews are elucidated by the secondary sources 
of data. The materials and information obtained from these sources aided and 
abetted the molding of the theoretical categories and warranted the criteria for a 
quality grounded theory. 
 In conducting grounded theory research as intended by Glaser and Strauss 
(1967), the researcher develops and blends into the conditions and contexts of the 
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study. This purports that in grounded theory, the researcher is duty-bound to be 
completely submersed in the area of inquiry. The development of a dynamic 
theory as well as theoretical concreteness springs from this submersion.  
 
3.5.1 The Primary Data Sources  
 The information collected as primary data for the research were sourced 
from the following: 
 Five profound and extensive focused interviews of key informants. 
These interviews were conducted with Graft Investigation and 
Prosecution Officers who are working for the OMB-MOLEO. Each 
interview began with general leading queries that were marginally 
reformed throughout the length and breadth of the research as 
concepts and categories started to come together. To permit for the 
spontaneity of discussion and an unhampered flow of ideas related 
to the concurrence of jurisdiction in administrative adjudications, 
the interview process departed from the stringency of a 
conventional structured interview procedure. 
 To clarify any of the statements disclosed by the participants, 
follow-up calls with a combination of correspondences through 
email and social media instant messaging were used as needed. 
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3.5.2 The Secondary Data Sources  
 The secondary sources of data facilitated the formation of the theoretical 
categories through inductive and deductive ratiocination. These facts and 
particulars were gathered in the form of commentaries, appraisals, assessments, 
and discussions on the incipient theoretical categories. The data from these 
sources helped validate the theory formulated in this study. The secondary sources 
include: 
 Formal and informal discussions with Investigators and other staff 
not only of the OMB-MOLEO, but of the whole Office of the 
Ombudsman. 
 Observations of OMB-MOLEO staff and officials. 
 
3.5.3 Focused Informant Interviews 
 Focused informant interviews were conducted with five senior Graft 
Investigation and Prosecution Officers. The selection of the key informants was 
guided by their familiarity with the processes and procedures in conducting 
adjudicatory work in administrative cases. The interviews and follow-up 
discussions were conducted over a two-month period starting on October of the 
year 2013. Allowing for geographical constraints, the interviews were conducted 
via Voice over IP (VoIP) or what is more commonly known as Internet 
Telephony. One interview was conducted over Skype, two on Facetime, and two 
via Viber. The dialogues were scheduled at the convenience of the interviewees, 
as such, one interview was accomplished after regular office hours (8:00 p.m.) on 
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a weekday, while the rest were carried out over the weekends, in sets of two and a 
week apart. Each of the interviews lasted for approximately 1.5 hours. Three 
separate supplemental discussions were rendered a week after the end of the initial 
interviews. These discussions were made through email correspondence as well as 
Facebook instant messages and Facetime calls.  
 The interviews were conducted in the language where the informants were 
most comfortable with, English and Filipino. The interviews started with an 
overview of what the study is about and what it aims to accomplish. The 
informants were then asked about their views, comments and experiences on the 
issue of concurrence of jurisdiction in the adjudication of administrative cases. 
This was a question broad enough for the informants to freely voice their thoughts 
and concerns while at the same time, limited enough to align their views and ideas 
to the details necessary for the research. The informants were given wide latitudes 
for free expression, the researcher interjecting a few probing questions only to 
keep the informants‘ responses on course. Notes of the interviews were logged 
and recorded to preserve the information. These notes form the basis for coding 
the data. 
  
3.6 The Coding Process 
 The coding process involves the uncovering of concepts, pure and simple. 
The process of coding entailed an examination of the data and the drawing 
together of their similarities and semblances (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). As an 
iterative process, the coding and sorting of the data collected persisted all the way 
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through the course of the study. Essential to the process of grouping, categorizing, 
and coding of the data is a process called ―memoing.‖ Researchers in grounded 
theory should be able to interact contemplatively with the data. As such, Glaser 
(1978) accentuates the memoing process to buttress the inventive relationship 
between the researcher and the data: 
―The core stage in the process of generating theory, the bedrock of 
theory generation, and its true product is the writing of theoretical 
memos… Memos are the theorizing write-up of ideas about codes 
and their relationships as they strike the analyst whilst coding… 
Memo-writing continually captures the ‗frontier of the analyst‘s 
thinking…‖ (p.83, emphasis in original) 
 
 Strauss and Corbin (1998) similarly underscored the significance and 
implication of the researcher‘s judgment in this iterative method: 
 
―We want readers to understand what we say, to understand why 
we are using certain activities, and to do so flexibly and creatively. 
We want them to question, to be able to easily move from what 
they see and hear and to raise that to the level of the abstract, and 
then turn around again and move back to the data level. We want 
them to learn to think comparatively and in terms of properties and 
dimensions, so that they can easily see what is the same and what 
is different. The importance of methodology is that it provides a 
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sense of vision, where it is that the analyst wants to go with the 
research.‖ (p.8, emphasis in original) 
 
 The rationale behind the employment of a focused interview process, as 
discussed by Merton & Kendall (1946), in the interviews conducted with the 
senior Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officers is the consideration for 
suitability and germaneness. Focused interviews contend with individuals who 
have participated, have been involved, and have actual experiences in a given 
situation or area. For this study, this signified that the selection of the GIPOs, 
whose responsibilities include the dispensation of administrative cases, was based 
on their firsthand and actual experience with the operational aspects of 
administrative adjudication. Also, the focused interview questions developed and 
have materialized from the circumstances that were considered prior to the 
interview. Taking into account the fact that the researcher has access to 
information that could influence the interview process, given the researcher‘s 
experience and functions as a member of OMB-MOLEO‘s administrative 
adjudicatory bureau, a reflection was had with the demand of grounded theory that 
the researcher‘s judgments and forethoughts ought to be deferred. It would also 
appear evident that for the GIPOs to consent to the interviews, the subject should 
be one that they themselves perceive as significant and valuable. For this reason, 
specific questions based on the operational areas of the OMB-MOLEO were 
avoided and broad areas for discussion were established instead. Broadening the 
areas for discussion allowed the interview to be focused and unrestricted. It is 
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focused since the subject of the inquiry had been ascertained and unrestricted 
since the participant can propound a wide range of commentaries and ideas. 
Further, an interview guide is used for the proceedings in the focused interview. 
The interviews radiated open-ended questions which urged the participants to 
completely explain their perspectives. Moreover, the involvements, mindsets, and 
sentiments of the participants are sought to be tapped in a focused interview. For 
this study, the research had taken advantage of the wealth of the participants‘ 
experiences.  
 What differentiates a focused interview from a more structured form of 
interview is the autonomy of the thought generating process. As a research 
method, grounded theory could be imperiled by an excessively scripted 
questioning. In the words of Glaser (2001):   
―this format for interview would stifle theoretical sampling and 
stop it dead in its tracks… especially with uniform coverage‖. 
 
In a structured interview, the same set of questions is asked for every 
participant and like a scriptwriter, the interviewer directs the pace of the 
interview. Additionally, the interviewer never interjects his comments to the 
responses being articulated by the participants (Glaser B. , 2001). This is the 
foremost reason that a less structured interview style has been adopted. 
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The coding process is illustrated by the figure below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7 Grounded Theory, a Discussion 
 Glaser and Strauss (1967) conceptualized grounded theory as a method to 
generate a theory from qualitative data. These data are accumulated by way of 
collecting information from people or groups of people who are involved with the 
social occurrence being studied. This being the case, there should be no 
differences of opinion about the term ‗theory‘ in the method of grounding a theory 
as Weiner (1990) may have observed. As McNabb (2002) had succinctly stated: 
Figure 3.6 The Coding Process 
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―The primary objective of grounded theory research is to develop 
theory out of the information gathered‖ (p.302, emphasis in the 
original). 
  
The result or end-product of using the methodology is denoted as the 
‗grounded theory‘. Grounded theory, when it was first intellectualized, was 
proposed as a study or a theory of the quality and foundations of knowledge in 
connection with the parameters and soundness of information grounded in the 
personal and distinctive events, incidents, and occurrences of everyday life. The 
procedures and methodology that have been established in grounded theory,  
―…are now among the most influential and widely used modes of 
carrying out qualitative research when generating theory is the 
researcher‘s principal aim. This mode of qualitative study has 
spread from its original use by sociologists to the other social 
sciences and to practitioner fields, including at least accounting, 
business management, education, nursing, public health, and social 
work.‖ (Strauss & Corbin , 1997, p. vii) 
  
Grounded theory is indicative of three processes or attributes, specifically, 
the modes of induction, deduction, and verification. The mode of induction 
implies that the researcher ventures into the research from square one. Building 
the research from scratch, the researcher must detach himself from his prejudices 
and biases. For the theory to develop from the gathered information, the 
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researcher is compelled to be impartial and adaptable (McCann & Clark, 2003). 
The effectiveness of grounded theory as a method is dependent on the degree 
precedence rendered to the data. The primacy of the integrity and significance of 
data is particularly triggered by the researcher‘s submersion in the area of 
investigation. Such deep-seated involvement leads to a conceptual density and 
‗thick description‘ of categories being constructed on the way towards generating 
a grounded theory (Seel, 2006). The saturation in data, to the extent that the data 
being collected no longer generates new concepts, marks the verification stage of 
the categories and concepts that are being fostered. The mode of deduction 
permits the deductive cross-examination of forecasts or extrapolations that may 
have surfaced during the course of the research against the resulting theory. 
 Grounded theory as a research method is, of course, not without any 
barriers or flaws. Founded from the initial work of Glaser and Strauss, there are 
two leading impediments to the use of grounded theory. To begin with, since the 
year 1967, Glaser and Strauss, in collaboration with Corbin, have taken different 
paths to explain what was meant in the first articulation of the approach (Seel, 
2006). Secondly, there is a prevalence of technical doctrines and principles on 
how grounded theory is supposed to be performed (Piantanida, Tannis, & Grubs, 
2004, p. 329). The fragmentation of the approaches to grounded theory, be it in 
accordance to Glaser (1978, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2002) or to Strauss & 
Corbin (1994, 1997, 1998), was recognized by Charmaz (2000) in her work which 
précised several studies asserting to be either ‗Glaserian‘ or ‗Straussian.‘ 
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 Despite this complexity, however, neither Glaser nor Strauss & Corbin 
suppressed the idea that the procedures used in grounded theory are flexible, 
adaptable, and irresolute. In fact, both schools of thought underscore the 
solemnity of methodological flexibility. According to Glaser and Strauss (1967, 
pp. 8-9): 
―Our principal aim is to stimulate other theorists to codify and 
publish their own methods for generating theory… In our own 
attempt to discuss methods and processes for discovering grounded 
theory, we shall, for the most part, keep the discussion open-
minded, to stimulate rather than freeze thinking about the topic.‖ 
 
The fundamental principle of flexibility was once more upheld by Strauss 
and Corbin (1998, p. xi): 
―This is not a recipe book to be applied to research in a step-by-
step fashion. Our intent is to provide a set of useful tools for 
analyzing qualitative data. We hope that… readers will come to 
realize the fluid and flexible approach to data analysis provided by 
this method.‖ (emphasis in original) 
 
 The crux of grounded theory, as stated by Charmaz (2000), steered the 
direction of this research: 
―The rigor of grounded theory approaches offers qualitative 
researchers a set of clear guidelines from which to build 
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explanatory frameworks that specify relationships among concepts. 
Grounded theory methods do not detail data collection techniques; 
they move each step of the analytic process toward the 
development, refinement, and interrelation of concepts. The 
strategies of grounded theory include (a) simultaneous collection 
and analysis of data, (b) a two-step data coding process, (c) 
comparative methods, (d) memo writing aimed at the construction 
of conceptual analyses, (e) sampling to refine the researcher‘s 
emerging theoretical ideas, and (f) integration of the theoretical 
framework.‖ (pp.510-511). 
 
3.7.1 The Interpretive Method in Grounded Theory   
 The interaction of social responsibilities and demeanors among individuals 
– or symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969) – is brought into play in the 
grounding of theory. It is a symbolic or figurative interaction since the processes 
involved the use languages, interpretations, words and symbols (Denzin, 1989). 
These symbols are assimilated and streamlined into ideas, notions, and 
philosophies as communities of people associate and mingle with each another 
(Stern P. , 1992). Symbolic interactionism, being one of the many branches of 
interpretive research, strives to extract and decipher the manner in which meaning 
is drawn from social situations (Stern, 1994; Schwandt, 1994). Grounded theory 
postulates that ‗people make sense of and order their social world even though, to 
the outsider, their world may appear irrational‘ (McCann & Clark, 2003, p. 8). 
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That is to say, it is imperative for the researcher to be skilled in bringing a 
receptive consciousness to the eccentricities and peculiarities of the different 
personalities and conditions that may be encountered for him to effectively 
theorize. 
 A researcher‘s responsiveness to a given social stimuli could be regarded 
as a significant influence of grounded theory on account of the fact that the theory 
cannot exist without the models conceptualized from the gathered data (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). Charmaz (2000), in her explication of grounded theory as a 
process, imparts researchers with a methodical stratagem for the formation of 
concepts from the data, to defining the links among these concepts, and followed 
by the drawing of a theory grounded from these concepts. As Piantanida, Tananis 
& Grubs (2004, p. 335) have succinctly noted: 
―It is the researcher‘s portrayals of these conceptual relationships 
that constitute a grounded theory… such grounded theories are 
recognized to be investigative or exploratory in nature, not 
predictive.‖ 
 
In essence, the situational and circumstantial gradations in a study that 
employs grounded theory are construed by the researcher harmoniously with the 
perception of other people.  
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3.7.2 Quality of the Grounded Theory 
 According to Glaser & Strauss (1967), the quality of a theory that had 
been grounded from data can be weighed by measuring the resultant theory 
against the benchmarks of fit, work, relevance, and modifiability. The concepts in 
each of these benchmarks are detailed as follows: 
 Fit – the benchmark of ‗fit‘ aims for the surfacing of theoretical 
categories from the data, in contrast to the categories being chosen 
from a predetermined academic view.  
 Work – the concept of ―work‘ intends that the sprouting theory is 
expected to be capable of explaining, predicting, and interpreting 
the phenomenon being researched.  
 Relevance – the notion of ‗relevance‘ seeks to render the bearing 
and applicability of the incipient theory to the hustles and bustles 
of the area being studied, with a concentration on the underlying 
plights and activities. 
 Modifiability – the idea of ‗modifiability‘ connotes the malleability 
or pliability of the engendered theory. The emerging theory could 
shift as additional information materializes.  
 
These benchmarks are intended to be of the same epistemological degree 
by Glaser and Strauss. However, some authors argue that the benchmark of fit is 
paramount to the other three (Lomborg & Kirkevold, 2003, p. 191). 
 In the employment of grounded theory as a research methodology, it is 
suggested that a significant expanse of consideration should be afforded to the 
focus of the inquiry, the issues, and the outcome of the study (Annells, 1997). 
Further, Annells (1997) advocates the researcher‘s reflection on the notions of 
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reality, certainty, and legitimacy, not only in the research process, but also, of the 
theory that develops. 
Enthused by the tenets of social constructivism, grounded theory can be 
perceived in either a postmodernist or poststructuralist point of view. The 
contemplation on the concepts of reality, truth, and validity can be commenced 
with an appraisal of the canons of social constructivism. Social constructivism, as 
it stands, has arisen from and remains influenced, by several ideologies. As such, 
to provide a specific description of social constructivism remains a challenge. One 
of the many prominent ideologies about social constructivism is that of Schwandt 
(2000). According to him, social constructivism is a scale of ranges amongst the 
outlooks that are tough or extreme and fragile or modest. Burr (1995), on the other 
hand, in observing the elements of cohesion along these series of events and 
occurrences, remarks that all standpoints on social constructivism share the 
following features: 
1. A critical stance towards taken-for-granted knowledge; 
2. Historical and cultural specificity; 
3. Believing that knowledge is sustained by social processes; and 
4. Believing that knowledge and social action go together  (Lomborg 
& Kirkevold, 2003, p. 196). 
 
In toto, the grips of social constructivism can be structured both on the 
echelons of individuality or collectivity. Essentially, the conviction of ‗truth‘ is a 
matter that is conditional, reliant on a person‘s sense of self, and provisional. 
In contrasting reality against the truth, Charmaz (2000) broadened the 
perspective of constructivism. In her words: 
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―constructivist approach does not seek truth – single, universal, 
and lasting. Still, it remains realist because it addresses human 
realities and assumes the existence of real worlds‖ (p.523).  
 
Accordingly, it is safe to believe that the theory which develops from a 
grounded theory research is not an embodiment of the reality that may be true to 
the ‗subject‘ engaged in the inquiry. Relatively, the theory that is generated from 
the texts of the interviews is swayed and persuaded by the researcher‘s 
interpretations, designations, and comprehensions of the circumstances within 
which the inquiry took place. Charmaz (2000, p. 523) clearly and distinctly 
clarified whatever confusion there may be when she said that, ―a grounded 
theorist constructs an image of a reality, not the reality – that is, objective, true, 
and external.‖ The preservation of the imagery that depicts the involvements of 
the participants, together with the consistency of the categories and the concepts 
that were established along the way of producing a grounded theory ―composes a 
story‖ (Lomborg & Kirkevold, 2003, p. 195) – the sort of reality propounded by 
Charmaz. 
 
3.7.3 The Indications for Fit 
 The central idea of fit in this research can be recognized on how the 
emergent theory grounded in the data parallels the social reality. From the 
discussions above, social reality is nothing but a representation of reality, a 
persona, and not a reality in its truest sense. The idea of fit as propounded by 
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Lomborg & Kirevold (2003) that fit should emanate from the data, which is also a 
preservation of the imagery that composes a story, is a refined balance from the 
initial sketch of Charmaz (2000).  
The confirmation of meeting the criteria of fit in grounded theory can be 
obtained when the generated theory tends to be reasonable and practical to the 
individuals involved in the area of study, so that the theory echoes their own 
experiences and involvements. For this study, the litmus test in the social 
constructivist perspective is that the theory generated from the research rings true 
with the individual realities of other GIPOs not only in OMB-MOLEO but the 
whole Office of the Ombudsman. Furthermore, that the grounded theory produced 
in this research is considered a ‗quality theory‘ since it complements the 
benchmarks of fit, work, relevance, and modifiability.  
 
3.8 Summary 
 To understand the issues affecting the decisions in administrative cases by 
the OMB-MOLEO in concurrence with other administrative tribunals, grounded 
theory was chosen as the method of research. To commence the process of finding 
and labeling of categories data was collected and then coded. The generated 
theory grounded on these data are, at best, a description the activities, processes, 
and practices of the GIPOs of OMB-MOLEO in the adjudication of administrative 
cases. The researcher‘s backdrop in the OMB-MOLEO has been a fundamental 
aspect in the acquisition of information and the conduct of interviews with senior 
GIPOs of the OMB-MOLEO. Within the grounded theory approach, the 
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researcher‘s background and preconceptions were deferred so as to permit the 
conversations to remain open and unhindered, the senior GIPOs were at liberty to 
control the pace and direction of the interview.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 THEORETICAL CATEGORIES 
4.1 Introduction 
 After reviewing the texts of the interviews with the senior GIPOs of the 
OMB-MOLEO who participated in the research, three theoretical categories 
emerged. It should be stressed that the memos and texts represented the raw 
impressions of the interviewees, such that these memos and texts were 
documented in the way that the GIPOs view the issues regardless of the 
researcher‘s own opinions on the matter. The proportions within which the 
perceptions of these senior GIPOs are to be understood create the framework 
within which the grounded theory is to be crafted.  The three categories that 
emerged from the constant comparison of memos and text are: 
1. Monitoring – as exemplified in lack of technical human resources; non-
implementation; lack of data; and impact. 
2. Coordination – as illustrated by clogging of case dockets; conflicting 
decisions; infringement of power; and verification. 
3. Consistency – as characterized by borrowed rules of procedure and 
discretion. 
 
Within each of these theoretical categories are their own individual 
subcategories. The subcategories are smaller scale clusters of related observations 
that were rolled up to craft the three theoretical categories. The categories are 
considered to be the conceptual elements of a theory, while the subcategories are 
the aspects or characteristics of that category. In reading through the excerpts 
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from the interviews, ideas and premises meander between each of the categories 
and their subcategories. The categories of monitoring and coordination, for 
example, blend at certain times such that one quotation contributes to the further 
understanding of the other.  
Presented below are the theoretical categories and their sub-categories. For 
a detailed and graphical representation of the codes specifically selected to be 
used in this research, please refer to Appendix 1 to 14. 
 
4.2 Monitoring 
 The monitoring aspect of administrative adjudications has been 
emphasized in almost all of the interviews conducted. Concerns about the lack of 
a monitoring board or body in terms of decisions issued in administrative cases by 
the OMB-MOLEO emerged as one of the most important factors affecting the 
concurrence of jurisdiction in administrative cases. Within the theoretical category 
of monitoring, the areas of concern are represented in the subcategories of lack of 
technical human resources, non-implementation, lack of data and impact. 
 
4.2.1 Lack of Human Resources 
 Most of the GIPOs in the administrative adjudication bureau of the OMB-
MOLEO do not perceive the concurrence of jurisdiction as a hindrance to the 
effective dispensation of administrative cases. In fact, most GIPOs welcome the 
idea of concurrence as compliments the limited technical human resources of the 
OMB-MOLEO. At present, there are twenty GIPOs functioning under the 
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Criminal Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative Adjudication Bureau 
(CIPAAB) of the OMB-MOLEO. The CIPAAB, as the name suggests, conducts 
preliminary investigations on criminal cases as well as the adjudication of 
administrative cases. Considering that the OMB-MOLEO has a very wide range 
of jurisdiction that spans the entirety of the law enforcement offices for the whole 
country, the concurrence of jurisdiction means a little less workload for the 
GIPOs.  
 Even with the slight decline of administrative cases being handled by the 
GIPOs of OMB-MOLEO because of the shared jurisdiction in adjudicating 
administrative cases, the lack of technical human resources still proves to be a 
burden in disposing administrative cases efficiently and speedily. Hence, the lack 
of human resources results to inadvertent delays in the adjudication of 
administrative cases. The weight of disposing or adjudicating one administrative 
case paralleled to the receipt of three new administrative cases may very well 
speak for itself. In simple terms, in the OMB-MOLEO, for every one 
administrative case disposed, three more are filed. By any statistical probability, 
there is a never ending influx of administrative cases, which cannot be handled by 
the small number of GIPOs working for the administrative adjudication bureau, 
who simultaneously are conducting preliminary investigations on criminal cases.  
 The constraint in the availability of human resources has, in due course, 
resulted to the inability of the OMB-MOLEO to institute a monitoring body. As 
the twenty GIPOs already have their hands full with the conduct of preliminary 
investigations on criminal cases as well as the adjudication of administrative 
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cases, there is no one left to oversee the monitoring of disposed administrative 
cases that carry with them the imposition of administrative penalties.  Thence, this 
lack of monitoring of disposed cases results to the decisions not being 
implemented at all by the offices or agencies concerned. The following relevant 
statements were offered by the GIPOs: 
o ―Kulang tayo sa tao.” (We lack manpower) 
o ―Mabuti nga may concurrence, kahit papaano eh nababawasan ang 
workload.‖ (Concurrence is a good thing, our workload could at least be 
lessened) 
o ―I hope they expand our workforce soon.‖ 
o ―Kaya mabagal, kasi konti lang ang gumagawa sa trabaho.‖ (Only a 
handful of persons do the work, and that is one of the reasons for the 
delays) 
o ―Kulang na nga tayo, yung iba huhugutin pa para mag monitor.‖ ( 
Considering the shortage of lawyers conducting adjudication, there is no 
one to pull-out to conduct monitoring)  
o ―I don‘t personally know if the Decisions I have issued over the years have 
all been carried out.‖ 
o ―Simple lang naman, dagdagan nila ang tao.‖ (Just add more people, it‘s 
that simple) 
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4.2.2 Non-implementation 
 A handful of decisions are issued by the OMB-MOLEO every month. 
These decisions may either be for the dismissal of the cases filed or the imposition 
of sanctions in connection with the public officer‘s administrative liabilities. 
Handing out these decisions may well be considered as the last mechanical act 
that the OMB-MOLEO executes in the adjudication of administrative cases. 
However, it was noted that a lot of these decisions, especially those that have 
adverse pronouncements, are not being implemented by the affected agencies. 
This non-implementation of decisions not only undermines the power of the 
OMB-MOLEO to adjudicate on administrative cases, but also and more 
essentially, it necessitates the creation of a monitoring body, board or bureau that 
ensures the proper implementation and recognition of OMB-MOLEO decisions in 
administrative cases.  
 Some public officers and employees that are penalized by the OMB-
MOLEO with suspension from the service or even dismissal from the service but 
have connections to some influential persons succeed in avoiding the 
implementation of such decisions. Some public officials also believe, and they are 
correct in so believing, that the OMB-MOLEO is not ensuring and confirming the 
proper implementation and execution of its decisions in administrative cases. In 
fact, one of the interviewees even recounted that in one of the lectures he 
conducted with the PNP, he was surprised to learn that among the audiences 
present during the lecture, one of them had been issued a decision in an 
administrative case in which he was suspended for six months from the service for 
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an administrative offense committed and despite this, he still was reporting for 
duty as a member of the PNP. The following opinions were articulated in the 
excerpts from the interviews: 
o ―I don‘t personally know if the Decisions I have issued over the years have 
all been carried out.‖ 
o ―Hindi ba’t parang bale wala lahat ng ginagawa natin kung hindi naman 
sila pinapatupad?”(Wouldn‘t it bother you if your Decisions are not being 
implemented?)  
o ―Nalalaman ko lang kung natatanggap ng mga respondent yung Desisyon 
kung sakaling may MR.‖ (I would only learn of the respondent‘s receipt of 
the Decision once they file for an MR [Motion for Reconsideration]) 
o ―Kung minsan nababalitaan ko nalang sa mga kakilala ko sa PNP na 
hindi naman pala na suspend yung pinatawan ko ng suspension.‖ (I 
sometimes hear news from my friends in the PNP that orders for 
suspension are not being effected) 
o ―Minsan nag lecture ako sa PNP, nagulat ako kasi yung isang nakausap 
ko may suspension pala, pero nagrereport pa sa trabaho.‖ (When I had a 
lecture at the PNP, I was shocked to know that one officer reports to work 
even after a decision was issued suspending him from the service) 
 
4.2.3 Lack of Data 
 The absence of a body focused in the monitoring of decisions in 
administrative cases is obviously apparent in the 2012 Annual Report of OMB-
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MOLEO. Reports had been generated and data have been collected in terms of the 
number of administrative complaints received and the number of disposed 
administrative cases. However, it is clear that OMB-MOLEO has no data as to the 
number of imposed administrative sanctions such as those warned, reprimanded, 
fined, suspended or dismissed public officers, or if these penalties were effected 
by the concerned implementing agencies.  
 The statistics and figures pertaining to the number of disposals with 
administrative sanctions with emphasis on the implementation of these 
administrative sanctions could definitely help in crafting informed procedural 
mechanisms that will strengthen the efficacy and expediency of administrative 
decisions issued by the OMB-MOLEO. The following are some perspectives of 
this subcategory: 
o ―Parang dati merong ganyan, hindi ko lam kung bakit wala na ngayon.‖ 
(Data like that exists before, I just don‘t know why it was discontinued) 
o ―We have some statistics, but sometimes, our (OMB-MOLEO) figures 
don‘t match the figures of the Central Office.‖ 
o ―The generation of data is a mechanical act; it is just a matter of adding up 
numbers. The problem is, no one is available to do it.‖ 
 
4.2.4 Impact  
 The drafting of a decision in an administrative case is both taxing and 
time-consuming. Efforts are wrested from the GIPOs in order to come up with 
decisions that are wise, proper and judicious. The issuance of a decision that can 
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have a positive impact in the public service is one of a GIPO‘s altruistic desires, 
and as such, a blatant disregard to any of the decisions issued by a GIPO does not 
sit well. As the decisions issued in administrative cases are the fruits of laborious 
efforts, these decisions should be recognized and the pronouncements therein 
should be respected and enforced. If not, all the toils wielded by the GIPOs would 
be efforts exercised in futility. It is by this sentiment that the GIPOs of the OMB-
MOLEO hanker for a mechanism to ensure compliance with the orders and 
decisions of the office. The mechanism for checks and balances in the 
implementation of OMB-MOLEO issued decisions would not only ensure the 
effective administration of justice, but at the same time, also paves way for the 
establishment of a channel to assess the relevance and performance of the 
decisions issued in administrative cases.  
 Sometimes, the public‘s reluctance in filing cases against erring 
government officials and employees are deepened by their perception and 
misconception that the decisions of the OMB-MOLEO are anyway not going to 
be implemented. The public would feel more confident in their calculations on 
how effective the decisions of the OMB-MOLEO are if there were to be a 
mechanism to check the implementation of administrative decisions. Here is what 
the participants have to say: 
o ―Hindi ba’t parang bale wala lahat ng ginagawa natin kung hindi naman 
sila pinapatupad?‖ (Wouldn‘t it bother you if your Decisions are not being 
implemented?) 
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o ―Mahirap din mag issue ng Decision, kasi iisipin mo, pamilya at 
kabuhayan nung tao ang apektado.‖ (When drafting decisions, you have to 
think about the effects that your Decision may have to the respondent‘s job 
and family)  
o ―Madalas ako makarinig ng tanong mula sa mga nagpapa-subscribe, kung 
talaga ba daw napaparusahan ang mga nagkakasalang empleyado ng 
gobyerno.‖ (Often do you hear people asking if the persons found guilty of 
an offense are really and actually disciplined) 
o ―Metikuloso ako sa pagsulat ng Desisyon, kaya kung minsan 
napapatagal.‖ (I think of every detail when I pen a Decision, and that 
consumes much of my time) 
 
4.3 Coordination 
 Coordination plays a big role in the adjudication of administrative cases, 
especially so when the administrative cases are those falling under the concurrent 
jurisdiction of the OMB-MOLEO and other law enforcement offices. The 
coordination of actions and the steps taken to ensure the timeliness of 
administrative proceedings enhances the sustainability and constancy of decisions 
being issued in these administrative processes.  
 
4.3.1 Clogging of Case Dockets 
 The senior GIPOs have had years of experience as prosecutors and 
adjudicators in the OMB-MOLEO, and none of them could say that they have 
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cleared their case dockets at any given timeframe. Case dockets refer to the 
control number assigned to a case that has been filed with the OMB-MOLEO. To 
be docketed as an Ombudsman case, the case should be complete in form and in 
substance. 
 The clogging of case dockets is an occurrence that happens when more 
cases are being docketed than those that are being disposed or terminated. For 
instance, a GIPO may be assigned ten to fifteen cases every month, half of which 
are administrative cases. The monthly disposal in administrative cases per GIPO 
is about five per month. This means that two or more administrative cases replace 
each disposal of an administrative case in any given month. This compounded 
growth of case dockets can be eased, to a certain extent, by the proper 
coordination of cases between the OMB-MOLEO and the other law enforcement 
agencies.  
 Most of the GIPOs interviewed felt that coordinated measures that impact 
the validity and verity of administrative cases filed with the OMB-MOLEO would 
guarantee a carefully selected receipt of complaints which would then lower, or at 
least limit administrative cases being catered to by the OMB-MOLEO. This 
screening of cases would ultimately lower the cases being docketed by the OMB-
MOLEO, thus, declogging the case dockets of each and every GIPO. In this 
regard, here are what the participants had to say: 
o ―I still have a lot of cases to dispose.‖ 
o ―Ang daming pumapasok na kaso, eh iilan lang ang natatapos ko kada 
buwan.‖ (A lot more cases are being filed than those being disposed of) 
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o ―Sa una palang sana, tinitignan na kung kaso ba siya o halatang 
nanghaharass lang.‖ (If there could only be a way to screen cases and 
determine their authenticity; this could prevent harassment suits from 
being docketed) 
o ―Yung evaluation ng mga kaso, dapat nakahiwalay sa CIPAAB.‖ (The 
evaluation of cases should be independent from and unattached to the 
CIPAAB) 
o ―I think the records divisions of both units need to communicate with one 
another.‖ 
 
4.3.2 Infringement of Power 
 It goes without saying that coordinated measures are being sought by the 
OMB-MOLEO to streamline the cases being brought before its office. So much so 
that sometime in the year 2012, the OMB-MOLEO and the PNP entered into a 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that tried to draw a line between their 
respective administrative adjudication authority over members of the police force. 
The agreement was drafted so that administrative offenses arising from graft and 
corrupt practices shall be dealt with by the OMB-MOLEO while other forms of 
administrative offenses would be catered to by the PNP thru its PNP-IAS.  
While this arrangement sounds very practical and favorable to both the 
OMB-MOLEO and the PNP, a great number of GIPOs in the OMB-MOLEO feel 
that such an agreement results to an infringement on the powers vested by law 
upon the OMB-MOLEO and the PNP-IAS. It is believed by the senior GIPOs in 
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the OMB-MOLEO that the provisions of the MOA amount to putting a limitation 
on the investigative powers of the OMB and PNP-IAS, when in fact, the enabling 
laws of each of these offices provide that they shall investigate on any complaint 
by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or 
agency, including the police force, when such act appears to be illegal, unjust, 
improper, or inefficient. The provision of law do not provide for any exception. 
The OMB-MOLEO and the PNP therefore, to the minds of the GIPOs, cannot, by 
mere agreement, limit the scope of each of their administrative jurisdiction. 
Moreover, such an agreement would be a violation of the lawful right of every 
complainant to choose which forum would speedily and properly address their 
grievances. 
As agreements between the OMB-MOLEO and the other law enforcement 
agencies tend to infringe vested powers, a proper and systematic coordination is 
then opined to be the best solution to support the concurrence of jurisdiction over 
administrative cases. This is evidenced in the following statements: 
o ―To my mind, this would result to an infringement on the power vested 
upon the OMB and PNP by law.‖ 
o ―May MOA, pero kadalasan naman hindi din nasusunod.‖ (I know about 
the existence of the MOA [Memorandum of Agreement], but the 
provisions therein are hardly ever followed) 
o ―Pwede sana, kaso hindi lang naman PNP and sakop ng jurisdiction natin, 
paano yung iba?‖ (That is feasible, however, not only do we have 
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concurrent jurisdiction with the PNP, but also with other adjudicating 
bodies) 
 
4.3.3 Conflicting Decisions 
 The concept of concurrence of jurisdiction over administrative cases 
necessarily carries with it the attribute that a complainant may seek redress for any 
actionable wrong committed by public officers or employees at any forum which 
the complainant believes would best give him/her a speedy and fair decision. This 
pursuit for justice and redress is of course subject to the rules and limitations on 
forum shopping, which would be discussed in the succeeding subcategory of 
verification.  
 There is no reason for alarm when a complainant files a case on the fora of 
his choosing, be it filed before the OMB-MOLEO or the PNP-IAS. A problem 
arises when a complainant files multiple complaints arising from the same 
incident and for the same cause of action, one before the OMB-MOLEO and 
another similar one before the PNP-IAS, with the intention of obtaining a 
judgment favorable to them from either forum. These instances of filing multiple 
suits of the same nature are not far from possible. Logistical constraints and a lack 
of coordination between and among the OMB-MOLEO and the other law 
enforcement agencies make it easy for complaints to slip by and be taken 
cognizance of by any of the adjudicating bodies.  
 In these cases of multiple filing of administrative complaints, the different 
adjudicating bodies independently carry on with the process of investigation and 
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adjudication. Proceeding from their own established rules of procedure, there is a 
big chance that in the end the findings of both fora may differ slightly or 
completely from each other. The differences in the decisions issued may be 
observed in terms of the penalties imposed, the duration of these penalties, or 
worse, the appreciation of the facts involved. At times, the decisions may even be 
completely contradictory, in that one adjudicating body may fully exonerate a 
respondent while the other adjudicating body may impose an administrative 
penalty.  
 The apparent lack of coordination between and among the different 
adjudicating bodies affect the proper dispensation of justice and could very well 
be considered as one of the challenges involved in trying to collectively work 
together under the umbrella of concurrent jurisdiction. The GIPOs‘ thoughts on 
this aspect are as follows: 
o ―Yung ibang tao kasi, hindi nila alam na bawal pala kung mag file sila ng 
complaint dito at sa kabila.‖ (Some people are uninformed about the rule 
on forum shopping) 
o ―Yung CNFS naman, parang formality lang.‖ (The CNFS seems more like 
a formality) 
o ―There are instances where the complainants sign a CNFS, but would tell 
you that a similar case is pending, and some even promise to withdraw the 
earlier complaint filed.‖ 
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o ―May mga nagtatanong sa akin kung bakit daw parehong charge pero 
magkaiba ng pinataw na penalty.‖ (I often get asked why different 
penalties have been imposed to seemingly identical charges) 
o ―Nakakatawa kung minsan kasi yung complainant, magtatanong sa iyo 
kung saan ba mas maganda mag file.‖ (It is quite funny to recall that 
complainants sometimes ask you which adjudicating body they could 
benefit more from) 
o ―May marerecieve ka nalang na counter-affidavit na sinasabing meron 
nang nai-file na kaso sa kanila sa IAS.‖ (Oftentimes, a counter-affidavit 
would be filed, alleging that the same case had already been filed with the 
IAS) 
 
4.3.4 Verification 
 Stemming from the subcategory of Conflicting Decisions, it could be said 
that one of the main arteries for the occurrence of this event is the lack of a proper 
and systematic verification practice on the existence or non-existence of similar 
complaints filed in any of the administrative adjudicating bodies which have 
concurrent jurisdiction. Many times, complaints received by the OMB-MOLEO 
from the public are docketed as formal complaints and investigations regarding 
the matter are initiated without properly verifying the existence of similar 
complaints arising from the same incident and against the same respondent with 
other adjudicating bodies like the PNP-IAS.  
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 It is worth mentioning that the OMB-MOLEO only accepts complaints 
which are ‗complete in form.‘ This means that each complaint must contain a 
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping (CNFS) or a Certification Against Forum 
Shopping. This CNFS certifies, among others, that the complainant has not filed 
any other complaint at any other forum against the same person, arising from the 
same acts and seeking redress for the same cause. Clearly, the intent of requiring a 
CNFS before a complaint may be accepted and docketed is the prevention of 
identical complaints being filed in different avenues with the purpose of obtaining 
the most favorable decision. A violation on this rule on non-forum shopping may 
cause for the dismissal of the complaint. 
 Despite the element of CNFS having been incorporated in the complaints 
filed, however, complaints with the same nature and reliefs sought are still being 
presented and filed with the different administrative adjudicating bodies. 
Regardless of the risks involved in the filing of multiple suits or complaints, the 
public are undeterred in violating this rule because to their mind, the chance of 
having their grievances acted upon and decided favorably is greater than the 
chance that their complaints may be found to have violated the rule against forum 
shopping. Unfortunately, they may be correct in so believing.  
 As previously touched upon in the earlier discussions in the previous 
subcategories, the OMB-MOLEO does not have the needed resources, much 
more, the luxury of time, in verifying the existence of similar complaints in the 
different adjudicating bodies with concurrent jurisdiction. Be that as it may, the 
tedious task of verification cannot and should not be dispensed with. The different 
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adjudicating bodies, the OMB-MOLEO included, must not solely rely on the 
CNFS attached to the complaints. The records division or any other division 
mandated to handle the receipt and docketing of complaints must have proper and 
systematic coordination procedures in order to alleviate the occurrence of filing of 
multiple complaints, without violating the confidentiality of records of cases 
pending before their respective offices. The following are some of the points 
considered for this subcategory: 
o ―Yung CNFS naman, parang formality lang.‖ (The CNFS seems more like 
a formality) 
o ―Hindi natatakot ang mga complainant kahit nag file sila sa multiple 
tribunals, kasi ang parusa lang naman, madidismiss yung mga nahuling 
nai-file.‖ (The aggressiveness of complainants in filing the same suits in 
different tribunals is not deterred by the rules since the only penalty for 
forum shopping is the dismissal of the subsequently filed cases) 
o ―Hindi naman pwedeng kasuhan lahat ng nag va-violate ng rule, hindi 
praktikal.‖ (It is not practical to file suits for violation of the rule against 
forum shopping) 
o ―Eh kung mayroon lang sanang magmamatiyag sa mga duplicate na 
cases.‖ (If there could only be a censoring body) 
 
4.4 Consistency 
 The consistency of decisions issued by the different administrative 
adjudicating bodies with concurrent jurisdiction, that of the OMB-MOLEO in 
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particular, has been one of the constraints that are incessantly being sought to be 
addressed by the GIPOs of the OMB-MOLEO. Arising from the fact that the 
OMB-MOLEO, and even the Office of the Ombudsman itself, has yet to 
promulgate its own rules of procedure in the conduct of administrative 
adjudication, the procedures adhered to by the OMB-MOLEO are borrowed either 
from the Civil Service Rules or the PNP Rules of Procedure in Administrative 
Cases. More so, there is no hard and fast rule in the appreciation of facts or the 
finding of evidence substantial enough to produce a decision in the adjudication of 
administrative cases. 
 
4.4.1 Borrowed Rules of Procedure 
 After nearly twenty-six years in operation, the Office of the Ombudsman 
has not yet established and promulgated its own rules of procedure in the conduct 
of adjudicatory proceedings in administrative cases. Let it be stressed 
nevertheless, that the Office of the Ombudsman has issued Administrative Order 
No. 7 on 10 April 1990 which prescribed and promulgated the rules to be 
followed in Administrative Cases. AO No. 7 has enumerated the grounds for the 
filing of a complaint and the procedures in the conduct of administrative 
adjudication, together with the corresponding penalties that may be imposed. 
What the procedures lack, then again, are the definitions of the offenses that may 
be charged, together with the schedule and duration of penalties. 
 Short of this more specific and detailed rules of procedure, the OMB-
MOLEO, in the adjudication of administrative cases, derives its rules from the 
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Civil Service Commission (CSC) via the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases 
in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and the PNP through their PNP Disciplinary 
Rules of Procedure (DRP). 
 The OMB-MOLEO‘s concurrence of jurisdiction with the PNP-IAS in 
administrative cases naturally necessitates the adherence of the OMB-MOLEO to 
the rules of the PNP-IAS, given that the OMB-MOLEO does not have its own 
procedures as yet. However, GIPOs in the OMB-MOLEO are more inclined to 
base their decisions upon the rules set by the CSC. It is a pragmatic adoption of 
the rules as the entirety of the different sectoral adjudicating bureaus of the Office 
of the Ombudsman adheres to such rules. Moreover, several Supreme Court 
decisions founded on the RRACCS are utilized and cited by the GIPOs as their 
basis in coming up with their own decisions in the adjudication of administrative 
cases.  
  With the GIPOs of the OMB-MOLEO tending to stick to the RRACCS, 
instances such as the difference in the application of the proper penalties and the 
duration thereof arises. Concretely, both the RRACCS and the DRP treat, define, 
and provide the penalties for the administrative offense of, for example, simple 
misconduct. In the RRACCS however, the administrative offense of simple 
misconduct is treated as a less grave offense punishable by suspension from the 
service for a period of one month and one day to six months. Hence, the RRACCS 
provides on rule 10, Section 46: 
―Section 46. Classification of offenses. – Administrative offenses 
with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or 
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light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the 
government service. 
A. The following grave offenses shall be punishable by 
dismissal from the service: 
xxx 
D. The following less grave offenses are punishable by 
suspension of one month and one day suspension to six 
months for the first offense; and dismissal from the service 
for the second offense: 
1. Simple Neglect of Duty; 
2. Simple Misconduct; 
xxx‖ (emphasis supplied) 
 
The DRP on the other hand, treats the administrative offense of simple 
misconduct as a light offense punishable by suspension from the service from one 
day to thirty days. Hence, in Part III, Rule 21, Section 2 states: 
―Section 2. Classification of offenses. – For purposes of 
determining jurisdiction and applying the appropriate penalty, 
administrative offenses are classified into light, less grave, and 
grave offenses. 
A. Light Offenses: 
1. Simple Neglect of Duty 
2. Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty 
3. Slight or Simple Misconduct; 
xxx‖ (emphasis supplied) 
 
Further, Rule 22, Section 2 on the range of penalties provides: 
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―Section 2. Range of Penalties. – The penalties for light, less grave 
and grave offenses shall be made in accordance with the following 
ranges: 
For Light Offenses: 
1) Withholding of privileges, restriction to specified limits, 
restrictive custody, suspension or forfeiture of salary, or 
any combination thereof from one day to ten days 
(minimum period); 
2) Withholding of privileges; restriction to specified limits; 
restrictive custody; suspension or forfeiture of salary; or 
any combination thereof from eleven days to twenty days 
(medium period); 
3) Withholding of privileges, restriction to specified limits; 
restrictive custody; suspension or forfeiture of salary; or 
any combination thereof from twenty-one days to thirty 
days (maximum period).‖  
 
 The GIPOs of the OMB-MOLEO are predisposed to follow their instincts 
and sound judgment in their appreciation of the facts surrounding the 
administrative case and the application of the proper penalties. What constitutes 
sound judgment is a matter of preference and discretion. Some comments were: 
o ―Natanong ko na yan dati sa mga datihan na sa opisina, ang sabi 
kasalukyan daw na ginagawa. Pero ilang taon na eh wala pa.‖ (I have 
already asked that before, and they told me that the rules are under way, 
and that was years ago) 
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o ―Ang gamit ko yung sa CSC, madami kasing mahahanap sa SCRA.‖ (I use 
the CSC rules as there are a lot of cases available on SCRA [Supreme 
Court Reports Annotated]) 
o ―Ang tanong, bakit mas mababa ang penalty sa ROP ng PNP?‖ (I often 
ask myself, why is the penalty lower in the PNP rules?) 
o ―Depende. Kasi minsan, yung complainant mismo ang magsasabi na ito 
ang na-violate, sa rules ng PNP, yung iba naman, rules ng CSC.‖ (It 
depends. Sometimes, the complainant himself would designate the 
offense) 
o ―Minsan magkakaiba talaga ang Desisyon ko kahit halos parang pareho 
ang offense, kasi depende yan sa facts ng kaso.‖ (I do come across issuing 
different Decisions for the same offense, as the decision is contingent upon 
the facts) 
o ―Ginagamit ko minsan ang ‘humanitarian consideration’.‖ (I sometimes 
take into account ‗human considerations‘) 
o ―Bakit iba?‖ (Why is it different?) 
 
4.4.2 Discretion 
 An adverse finding on decisions involving administrative cases requires 
and demands the existence of substantial evidence. Substantial evidence has been 
defined in a number of Supreme Court decisions as such relevant evidence that a 
reasonable mind may accept to justify or support a conclusion. The Supreme 
Court went on to state that the requirement of substantial evidence is satisfied 
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when there is reasonable ground to believe that the person complained of is guilty 
of the act or omission as charged, even if the evidence is not overwhelming or 
prodigious.   
 Given the wide latitude of discretion in ascertaining the existence of the 
quantum of evidence in administrative cases, GIPOs of the OMB-MOLEO and 
the other investigators and adjudicators of the administrative adjudication bodies 
of law enforcement offices, base their decisions on what they think is right and 
just. There is no quantifiable means to ascertain the substantiality of the evidence 
presented, just so long as the evidence is reasonable and acceptable. As to what 
constitutes reasonableness and acceptability, the same is left at the prudence and 
canniness of the adjudicator.   
 It must be understood that the extensive flexibility of discretion among 
adjudicators does not equate to an ill-advised and misguided verdict. Stringent 
measures are practiced to promote the insightfulness and acuity of the 
adjudicator‘s findings and pronouncements. The tricky aspect in finding for the 
substantiality of evidence in administrative adjudications is that no two minds 
think exactly alike. However collectively trained and jointly proficient 
adjudicators are, there are always issues and details that each of them perceive 
differently from the other. Some of the remarks from the GIPOs were: 
o ―Nag attend ako ng training dati, kung paano gumawa ng Desisyon.‖ (I 
have previously attended trainings for the issuance of Decisions) 
o ―Ang gamit ko kadalasan yung SCRA.‖ (I often cite the SCRA as my 
reference) 
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o ―Naririnig ko minsan sa usapan ng mga tao dito, bakit daw iba ang 
appreciation ko sa facts.‖ (I overheard some GIPOs talking once, they 
were discussing within themselves as to why my appreciation of the case 
is different) 
o ―Di ba iba-iba naman tayo ng interpretasyon?‖ (We all have differing 
interpretations) 
o ―Halimbawa, may isang mansanas, kung ikaw ang tatanungin, maaaring 
sabihin mo, maliit na mansanas yan na hugis puso. Kung ako tatanungin, 
sasabihin ko, katamtaman lang ang laki nya at hugis ngipin.‖ (Here‘s the 
thing, if we both see an apple, you may say that the apple is small and 
heart-shaped, but for me, it is a medium sized apple that is tooth-shaped) 
 
4.5 Summary 
 In summary, the concurrence of jurisdiction in the administrative cases 
handled by the OMB-MOLEO appears to be a composite collaboration between 
the different administrative adjudicating bodies that are multifocal in character. In 
utilizing the grounded theory data method, the conceptual elements or categories 
of the emergent theory were ascertained as: monitoring, coordination and 
consistency; whereas the subcategories or the specific attributes of these 
categories were determined to be: lack of technical human resources, non-
implementation, lack of data, impact, clogging of case dockets, conflicting 
decisions, infringement of power, verification, borrowed rules of procedure and 
discretion. Not only do these categories and subcategories sustain the theoretical 
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elements of the framework, but they also facilitated in the conceptualization of the 
theory. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 LITERATURE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 The chapter on review of related literature is deferred in grounded theory 
in an attempt to have it drawn together subsequent to the conclusion of 
information-gathering and after constant comparison has engendered theoretical 
categories. The kinds of literature that need to be considered in grounded theory 
are indicated and suggested by the data and the emergent theoretical categories. 
The grounded theory approach incessantly extracts data from the texts to 
conceptualize the subcategories and theoretical categories and ultimately, a theory 
that has been grounded from these data. With a view of generating a grounded 
theory, the texts are continuously weighed against each other and the keynotes 
that develop from these texts are classified and marked as theoretical categories. 
Throughout the whole research process, the initially identified theoretical 
categories fused and melded with each other giving rise to three of the more 
prominent theoretical categories. When additional conversations fall short of 
adding any substance to the existing categories or when the existing categories 
become recurrent in supplementary interviews, the categories have reached their 
saturation and the segment of research in the field is now terminated. The residual 
task is to draw from the categories a predominant theory that revolves around the 
concurrence of jurisdiction in the adjudication of administrative cases. The 
recourse to the literature aims at working toward recognized theories or paradigms 
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that tackle the theoretical categories and the emergent theory. While it may be so 
that at the beginning of this study, the researcher was inclined to believe that the 
literature would be based on studies conducted involving ‗delay‘ and 
‗redundancy‘ in relation to ‗concurrence in jurisdiction,‘ the emerging theoretical 
categories proved otherwise. Instead, the study points out that the literature that 
needed to be discussed were those of monitoring, coordination and consistency – 
the theoretical categories. However, before going into the literature that addresses 
the different categories that emerged from this study, it is just fitting to present 
some literature about concurrence in jurisdiction. 
 
5.2 Concurrence in Jurisdiction 
 Statutes that allocate authority or jurisdiction to multiple agencies may be 
the norm, rather than an exception. As has recently been noted, ―we live in an age 
of overlapping and concurring regulatory jurisdiction‖ (Gerson, 2006). There are, 
however, many adaptations of shared jurisdiction systems, and all need not be 
treated identically by the law. Concurrence of jurisdiction evolves when a statute 
addresses a certain policy where authority is allocated to two governmental 
entities. Conceptually, the allocation of authority can be achieved in any number 
of ways and the two dimensions of variation must, nevertheless, be considered: 
exclusivity and completeness (Gerson, 2006). With regard to exclusivity, the grant 
authority might be to one agency alone or to two or more agencies, while in 
reference to completeness, the delegation of authority may be to act over the 
entire policy space or only subset of the space. If two or more agencies receive 
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concurrent authority to regulate in a field, there is jurisdictional overlap (Gerson, 
2006).  
The levers of completeness and exclusivity are two of many that could be 
adjusted to vary agency authority. The law might allocate overlapping 
jurisdiction, but give different policy tools to different agencies, possibly giving 
rulemaking authority to one agency and enforcement authority to another. Both 
agencies could act in the same policy area, but one could do so using rules and the 
other using adjudications. Alternatively, holding the type of policy tools constant, 
both agencies may possibly have overlapping authority, but one agency might be 
given dominant authority, either explicitly or implicitly. In the case of direct 
conflict between the two agencies on some legal question, one agency‘s decision 
might clearly control. For example, if one agency has rulemaking authority and 
another only enforcement authority, and the two agencies disagree on the meaning 
of a statutory term, the interpretation proffered by the agency with rulemaking 
authority might control or vice versa (Gerson, 2006). 
 An agency with rulemaking authority might be given preference because 
the process of making rules better incorporates both democratic and informational 
expertise, but enforcement proceedings allow agencies to incorporate more 
particularized insights, so perhaps the opposite inference is also as plausible. That 
is, the important ensuing query on whether authority is equal or hierarchical has 
been left unresolved by the mere fact of jurisdictional overlap (Meazell, 2012). In 
practice, jurisdictional boundaries between political institutions are also vague or 
ambiguous. The outcome in many jurisdictional cases depends on whether 
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agencies have jurisdiction and whether a specific agency views warrant deference. 
If defining jurisdictional borders is generally difficult, it will be even harder in 
shared jurisdiction regimes. If a statute clearly gives some jurisdiction to one 
agency to administer one portion of a statute, and clearly gives some jurisdiction 
to another agency to administer another portion of the statute, a dilemma arises on 
how to treat agency interpretations or assertions of authority with respect to a third 
portion of the statute, related to both other sections. 
Overlapping jurisdiction in a world with indistinct borders is a practical 
mess for agencies, courts, and private parties. So why would legislature rely on 
shared jurisdiction schemes? Scholarship in political science and economics 
provides one answer. Delegation by legislature to other institutions creates agency 
problems such as the repression of information and cynical policy choices. 
Overlapping jurisdiction schemes can be understood as a partial response to these 
problems. More specifically, legislature might use overlapping jurisdiction as a 
mechanism for encouraging the development and accurate revelation of 
information by agencies, or as a means of controlling agency conduct and 
substantive policy choices. Jurisdictional overlap should be understood as 
additional tools for structuring the incentives of administrative agencies (Gerson, 
2006).  
As an instrument for handling agency problems, competing agents are 
depended upon when a statute apportions authority to several governmental 
institutions (Meazell, 2012). Giving authority to multiple agencies and allowing 
them to compete against each other can bring policy closer to the preferences of 
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legislature than would delegation to a single agent. To illustrate, consider the 
problem of agency expertise. 
A potential justification for the use of complete and exclusive jurisdiction 
is to facilitate the use of relevant agency expertise in the implementation of a 
policy. If one agency has expertise in a field and a second agency in another, 
legislature should delegate to the most informed agency. The trouble with this 
view of expertise is that it is static and exogenous; but agency expertise is itself a 
function of many factors, including the degree of discretion given to the agency, 
the costliness of developing expertise, the degree of divergence between agency, 
and other political influences like interest groups. However, agency expertise 
should neither be static nor exogenous, but rather, a function of existing 
institutional arrangements (Gerson, 2006). Like other mechanisms for mitigating 
principal-agent problems, the creation of enticements for agencies to capitalize in 
the development and improvement of expertise can be achieved by the allocation 
and delegation of jurisdiction (Bamberger, 2008). If agencies prefer to increase 
jurisdiction rather than decrease it, assigning overlapping jurisdiction gives 
agencies an incentive to invest in information.  
Jurisdictional overlap uses delegation to competing agents to control 
agency behavior. This scheme, however, can be sensibly understood as intentional 
mechanisms for mitigating agency problems inherent in delegation to other 
political institutions.  
Redundancy can also increase the reliability of bureaucratic performance, 
and using multiple agents may also provide for monitoring and reporting of agent 
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behavior by competing agencies themselves. This is not to say that jurisdictional 
overlap is a silver bullet for agency problems. Overlapping jurisdiction also 
creates a risk of shirking both agencies when legislature observes only outcomes 
and not effort. Moreover, redundancy in the assignment of bureaucratic tasks can 
also create duplicative monitoring and enforcement costs. Overlapping 
jurisdiction, therefore, is not necessarily an ideal structure for delegation. But 
there is an implicit logic in the use of overlapping schemes that can itself be traced 
to an elaborate theoretical literature in economics and political science. 
If manipulating jurisdiction is an effective tool for constraining agencies, 
then several conclusions might follow. First, courts might adopt interpretive 
practices that support rather than undermine these statutory schemes. For 
example, a common view is that courts owe no deference to agency views of 
shared jurisdiction statutes; Legislature would not want courts to defer to the view 
of one agency when the statute is administered by many agencies. The competing 
agents‘ framework suggests otherwise. Deference is a form of reward, which 
could encourage agencies to develop expertise and enter areas of ambiguous 
jurisdiction. Second, the same framework has implications for deference and 
preemption, though the implications are less clear. When a statute allocates 
overlapping jurisdiction to governmental entities, courts might endeavor to 
preserve concurrent jurisdiction, perhaps by refusing to defer to agency decisions 
to preempt state law (Gerson, 2006).  
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5.3 The Theoretical Categories 
Since a pivot to the literature seeks to obtain established theories or 
paradigms that tackle the theoretical categories and the emergent theory, the 
different aspects associated with the theoretical categories in this research are 
exemplified in the succeeding sections. 
 
5.3.1 Monitoring 
Monitoring is a special analytical procedure used to produce information 
about the modes and, consequently, the results of the implementation of the work 
of institutions and/or policies. As such, monitoring is regarded as one of the 
crucial procedures with which it is possible to audit the work of public authorities, 
be it from the perspective of the institutional settings and jurisdictions, resources 
and processes (actions and activities), or the perceptions of the wider environment 
in which the audited institutions of public authorities operate. Since each 
institution is, according to the democratic governance standards, on one side 
subjected to the control and accountability of its making and on the other side 
strives to get feedback, the monitoring of its implementation (or making, 
performance) is one of the crucial tasks. This feedback represents the basis for the 
future attitudes and orientations of the monitored institution and its activities, as 
well as for the assessments, attitudes and orientations of the environment towards 
it. These reactions are the crucial ones for why public pursuit of the already 
existing and implemented practices and patterns in democratic societies and 
institutions is of fundamental importance (Lipicer & Lajh, 2013).  
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 Based on the described broader mission, monitoring of the 
implementations performs four major functions: explanation, accounting, auditing 
and compliance (Dunn, 2004, pp. 355-356). Explanatory function of the 
monitoring yields information about the outcomes of the implementation, and it 
can help to explain why the outcomes differ or are such as they are. The 
accounting function of the monitoring process is important for delivering the 
information that can help in the accounting of various changes that follow the 
implementation of a process or policy. The auditing function or monitoring 
enables one to determine whether resources and services that have been targeted 
to the beneficiaries or certain target groups have actually reached them. Finally, 
monitoring in case of the function of compliance helps to determine if the process, 
activities and resources, staff and others involved are in compliance with the 
standards and procedures that are defined in advance, either by the institution 
itself or by the external environment. 
 Due to the functions described, a set of specific aims and expectations for 
monitoring the implementation of work of institutions and their policies can vary 
and, as such, can be a result of either internal needs or external environmental 
expectations, or both. But, regardless of that, monitoring concerns a very concrete, 
operational type of governance perspective, enabling the provision of a kind of 
operational, managerial procedure type of information and evidence about the 
selected aspects of performance of institutions and their activities, as well as 
potentially a preliminary assessment of the impacts of implementation for the past 
or future work. Although it seems that monitoring is predominantly concerned 
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with the micro, or specific type, of individual and concrete aspects of governance, 
it can also serve a broader function as a platform for policy learning and the 
potential introduction of policy changes on the basis of monitored data, and, in the 
long run, as a sort of evidence-based foundation (Pawson, 2006) for system-wide 
reconsiderations of general norms and values, such as democracy, transparency, 
cooperation, human rights and well-being. 
Parallel to what has been described here, it is essential to observe that a set 
of fundamental issues, which need to be covered and monitored on the basis of the 
defined goals, motives, expectations, mission and applied procedures for data 
gathering, must be clearly set. 
Today, a number of monitoring sources (i.e. contexts of the data) are 
already defined in practice through the ―codes of conducts‖, as institutional/policy 
guidance, guidelines, standards etc. of governance. To measure them, some data 
already exist and can simply be extracted from the existing data sets, while other 
data are either being gathered for internal institutional purposes, are not publicly 
available or do not yet exist. 
In other cases, especially those which have not yet established governance 
measurement practices and where data are not yet gathered, there is a need to 
conceptualize and further collect the data from scratch. In this regard, the data 
need to be conducted mostly by applying methods such as conducting a review of 
relevant existing documentation and data that have been primarily gathered for 
other purposes (e.g. statistics, financial, policy documents) and conducting 
surveys and interviews, as well as employing focus groups, panels and similar 
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methods for gathering information on the perceptions of implementation practices. 
On this basis, new data sets can be designed and applied. 
 
5.3.2 Coordination 
 One of the crucial influences for a fruitful involvement in inter-agency 
relations is policy coordination (Metcalfe, 2004). The concept of coordination 
prevents agency division and detachment while enabling the entirety of all the 
units to perform soundly than the each of the fragments. Coordination can be 
defined in a number of ways and in as many different contexts as it may be used. 
Coordination, when used in the context of an inter-governmental process, means 
that the component of analysis is national government and the concentration is on 
coordination among agencies or ministries (Metcalfe, 2004).  
 An extensive study of the subject of coordination as one of the 
fundamental attributes of governance and public administration is provided by 
Peters (1998). According to him: 
―Studies have examined the incentives that lead government 
institutions and public servants to make efforts to work better 
horizontally, some of them being: reduction of financial 
expenditures through optimization of government procedures; 
proliferation of cross-cutting issues that require simultaneous 
actions by several institutions; internationalization of many policy 
areas; and participation in the work of various international fora.‖  
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Despite these incentives, however, a cloud of doubt lingers around the 
practicality and expediency of isolating the various dimensions of coordination 
and the segregation of coordination issues from other interdependently related 
matters of administration and policy. From these reservations, Peters (1998) 
observed a number of predicaments:  
―Should attention be focused more on policy coordination or on the 
coordination of administration? Should the coordination be 
imposed by the center of government or be developed and owned 
by the actual participants (i.e. the institutions that create or 
implement a specific policy measure)? What are the models and 
techniques for achieving coordination?‖ 
 As a final point, Peters (1998) has roused his concern in the correlation between 
coordination and accountability. Accordingly, the ability of bureaucrats and the 
general public to determine answerability for any blunder or mistake in any given 
project or undertaking is indicated by ‗accountability;‘ and the capacity to impose 
this accountability is diminished by complex coordination programs (Saner & 
Yui, 1996). 
Still, in the absence of strong interagency coordination, multiple agency 
delegations create the potential for considerable dysfunction. The challenge in 
managing such related authorities is the preservation of practices that causes 
agencies to neglect contradictory or discordant policies that undermines their 
common objective while  allowing them to individually exhibit their relative 
proficiencies. For this, coordination is essential. Not only can formal coordination 
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efforts improve on the unofficial coordination measures that usually ensue in the 
administrative level, but it also can be superior to merely consolidating numerous 
agencies into a single bureaucracy, which does not guarantee that they will work 
together cooperatively (Freeman & Rossi, 2013).  
Agencies could adopt reforms aimed at improving coordination. In 
addition to tracking and evaluating their coordination efforts, some additional 
targeted improvements could help render a more transparent and useful 
coordination tools. These include (Freeman & Rossi, 2013):  
a) The development of coordination polices among agencies.  
Primarily, while agencies should have established and 
implemented their own procedures and policies to enable coordination 
with other agencies, a considerable number of agencies have still to do so. 
Agencies should be required to identify any areas of authority or 
jurisdiction that could implicate or gain from interagency coordination 
generally or with respect to specific sister agencies. Such policies should 
address, among other things, how to reduce duplication of effort in 
complying with the numerous diagnostic prerequisites imposed by law and 
how to resolve conflicts with other agencies over their application.  
b) Disclosure of best practices.  
Means and methods for sharing best practices and provisions for 
evaluation mechanisms should be initiated for a sound policy on 
coordination.  These best practices may include systems for multiparty 
rulemaking apart from recommendations on using the process even when 
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the agency is not compelled to do so by law. Also, best practices may 
incorporate the creation of joint technical teams for cultivating the 
analytical foundation of the rule.  
c) Supporting and Funding Interagency Consultation. 
Optional or voluntary interagency consultation provisions can be 
fairly and effortless ignored by an agency. Consultation provisions are 
valuable instruments for providing important information that may affect 
the decision making process of an agency. Moreover, the inputs of other 
agencies are rarely of value as the solicited comments that are intended for 
the agency‘s considerations have, by the time of response, already been 
concluded. This problem may be regulated if the consultations are 
continuing and integrated instead of being intermittent and spontaneous. It 
is also imperative that consultations transpire in advance; before concepts 
are cooped up in the decision making process.  
d) Increasing the Visibility of MOUs.  
Practically informal, a Memorandum of Understanding is easily 
deployed by partnering agencies. The convenience of this self-regulating 
agreements, while enticing to most agencies, correspondingly renders 
them usually unenforceable and, in general, totally shielded from judicial 
review. Also, since MOUs deal with internal affairs of agencies, they need 
not be published. The problem with this is that arrangements that affect 
policies or the rights and interests of the general public are supposed to be 
conspicuous and easy for both legislature and the public to trace. The 
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openness of these documents to the public benefits other agencies who 
wish to learn from others, as well as offices or agencies that are deprived 
of any system to supervise the operation of MOUs.  
e) The tracking of resources.  
The development of approaches for checking the total funds 
expended on interagency consultations, MOUs, joint rules, and other 
similar instruments is necessary to appraise the costs of coordination. 
Initially, this attempt may perhaps be restricted to urgent and pressing 
interagency coordination efforts, such as critical two-way policymaking. 
With this data, it may well be viable to measure the expenditure on rules 
that are jointly produced against that of the budget on rules that are created 
by independent agencies.  
 
5.3.3 Consistency 
The concept of consistency is made manifest when similar facts yield 
similar outcomes. Consistency in the aspect of adjudication is considered to be a 
prelude of parity before the law and a requirement to the Rule of Law. According 
to Finlay & Ogden (2011), the strive for consistency ought to be poised against 
the other preconditions to the Rule of Law, i.e. the notions that decisions are to be 
entrenched from their particular actualities and be issued by the individuals who 
preside over the case.  
Similar facts yielding similar outcomes, or consistency, could well be 
understood in a twofold connotation: substantive and procedural consistency. 
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Substantive consistency means that a dispute embracing a specific factual milieu 
will bring about an identical decision as in another dispute with the same factual 
milieu. Procedural consistency denotes that analogous cases are bound by the 
same extent of procedural mode or tactic. Within the adjudicatory perspective, 
consistency further implies that decisions are drawn from the same scale of 
polices and rules (Finlay & Ogden, 2011). 
The concept of consistency, when applied in tribunal decision-making, 
needs to be aligned with two rudimentary and dovetailed ideologies. For the most 
part, the decision maker should come to terms with the appearance of 
independence and impartiality. It should be stressed that a blatant and open 
aspiration for consistency may be beget skepticisms on prejudice or partiality. 
Also, the decision maker who sits in judgment over the issue should be the same 
person who settles the case. An instance where third parties try to influence or 
induce the pronouncements in any given case enfeebles the decency and propriety 
of the decision maker‘s fortitude. 
Apart from harmonizing consistency with the principles of neutrality and 
autonomy, consistency must also be inclined to respond to the rule-guided nature 
of administrative tribunals. This rule-guided nature of administrative tribunals 
indicates that the strictures and considerations of the idea of consistency in the 
tribunal framework are widely divergent from consistency as used in the judicial 
arena. To illustrate, Finlay & Ogden (2011) have laid down application of the 
doctrines of ‗res judicata‘ and ‗stare decisis.‘ Res judicata simply means that the 
earlier verdicts or pronouncements regarding the same persons do not hold sway 
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over a subsequent case between the parties. The non-adherence to the rule on res 
judicata sanctions tribunals to be more flexible in effectively regulating the 
subtleties and undercurrents between the parties to the dispute (Blake, 2011). 
The doctrine of stare decisis entails that the whys and wherefores leading 
to a prior decision in a similar issue does not prompt nor persuade the pretext of a 
case in extant. Naturally, this rule is without any restriction or exception. Findings 
of facts ascertained in previous proceedings between the parties can be relied 
upon in a subsequent case. Decision makers could likewise be guided by other 
cases in the imposition of sanctions or penalties. Moreover, legal analysis from 
earlier decisions could equally be considered (Finlay & Ogden, 2011).  
The pliancy accorded to administrative tribunals in the conduct of 
adjudicative processes is not absolute. Tribunals are confined within the limits of 
their enacting laws or the statutes that create them. Tribunals also function within 
the perimeters of judicial review. An individual who may be subjected to 
contradictory and incompatible burdens or decisions from different tribunals may 
ask for court intercession to ascertain which of them should dominate (Blake, 
2011). 
However, the judicial search for consistency in tribunal decision-making is 
not absolute. In the words of Finlay & Ogden (2011): 
―Notwithstanding the validity of the objective, courts are 
slow to review tribunal decisions where the sole requested ground 
is inconsistency. Such reviews undermine the decision-making 
autonomy, the expertise, and the effectiveness of those tribunals. 
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As such, a direct conflict between two tribunal decisions is 
insufficient reason for the judicial review and quashing of either. 
Nor is consistency to be expected in all circumstances: a number of 
inconsistent decisions can exist before a consensus emerges.‖ 
 
To achieve and enhance consistency, Finlay & Ogden (2011) have 
advocated certain tools and implements in tribunal decision-making which are 
generally more functional than legal, given that they involve the exercise of 
tribunal managerial power rather than changes to the content of parties‘ rights. 
Listed below are the thrusts promoted by Finlay & Ogden: 
(a) Jurisprudence 
Despite the fact that the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply, perhaps 
the most effective tool to achieve and enhance consistency is a tribunal 
jurisprudence. Such a body of decisions has ample benefits: 
 Losing parties know that they have been treated the same as other 
previously unsuccessful parties and so are more likely to accept their loss. 
 Parties can assess their likelihood of success. 
 Parties can prepare a focused case. This helps to avoid unnecessary 
interlocutory applications and reduce postponement and adjournment 
requests. 
 Tribunal management can assess the tribunal members‘ performance in 
achieving consistency. 
 The governing ministry, law society and law associations, and society in 
general, can assess the tribunal‘s institutional performance. 
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 Change over time in the understanding of a statute can occur more 
comfortably if the bases of prior understandings were explained in those 
earlier decisions. 
 Any judicial review will be able to review the context of the reviewed 
decision. 
 
A jurisprudence is of little or no use if it is not readily accessible to actual 
and potential parties, tribunal members, media, the public, academics, and others. 
Ideally, decisions should be (Finlay & Ogden, 2011): 
 Organized and searchable. Indeed, organization and the ability to search 
may be prerequisites to the existence of a jurisprudence. 
 Indexed. 
 Summarized, for example, in the form of headnotes. 
 Published, preferably electronically. 
 
The publication of decisions are carried out by certain tribunals, some 
even do so in searchable layouts and catalogued by topic. Then again, a number of 
tribunals have elected not to publish their decisions on account of privacy 
regulations and statutes. Some other decisions are published as jurisprudential 
guides where only a section of the pronouncement is published. In these cases of 
selective publication, it is imperative to fashion a balanced procedure to control 
and regulate the sources these fragmented decisions. For instance, the Ontario 
Landlord and Tenant Board, which publishes selected sections of decisions, base 
their selections on decisions that: 
 Interpret or explain an area of law; 
 provide a clear analysis of a point of law; 
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 apply or distinguish decisions of a court of competent jurisdiction, 
including the Divisional Court; 
 apply an Interpretation Guideline of the Board or provide clear reasons for 
not applying an Interpretation Guideline; and/or 
 raise new or interesting issues. 
 
(b) Leading Case Strategy 
A ―leading case strategy‖ is a premeditated attempt by the tribunal or its 
administrative agency to take on, plan, and then litigate a case in a manner that 
results in a decision that is persuasive not only on matters of law or mixed fact 
and law, but also on particular matters of fact. The result may be described as a 
―leading case‖. 
In comparison, regular, unplanned and non-premeditated cases may be 
persuasive on matters of law or mixed fact and law, but not on matters of fact. 
Such ―unplanned‖ cases may in practice become leading cases for the bar. Where 
a tribunal or administrative agency has identified these ―unplanned‖ cases as 
persuasive on matters of law or mixed fact and law, they are described as 
―jurisprudential guides‖. 
 
 (c) Binding Rules 
A constating or other statute may permit an agency that oversees a 
tribunal, or the tribunal itself, to create rules that are binding on that tribunal. If 
the statute grants a discretion and also an ability to introduce a rule respecting the 
exercise of that discretion, then the agency or tribunal can mold the exercise of the 
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discretion in a reasonable way that is consistent with the statute. Whether the rules 
are binding depends on the authorizing statute. Such rules will be binding where 
the statute specifically authorizes the agency to make rules concerning the 
tribunal‘s exercise of discretion.  
These binding rules may include Rules of Practice. Rules of Practice 
promote consistency in approach because all decision-makers work from a clear 
set of standards. In addition, they signal to parties the types of information that the 
tribunal requires or expects (Gottheil & Ewart, 2010). 
 
(d) Soft Law 
A tribunal may issue and use policy statements, guidelines, manuals, 
handbooks and other similar material in order to influence the decision-making of 
its members. Such instruments are known in this context as ―soft law‖ because 
while in form they do not bind tribunal members, in practice tribunal members 
tend to observe them. 
These instruments enable a tribunal to deal with a widespread policy issue 
comprehensively and proactively, rather than on an incremental case-by-case 
basis. Because these instruments can be put in place relatively easily and adjusted 
in the light of experience, they are usually preferable to formal rules that typically 
require external approval and drafting appropriate for legislation. They are also 
particularly helpful for large tribunals that sit as panels, where tribunal members 
may otherwise have their individual preferences. Tribunal members must not 
slavishly follow guidelines; neither can they ignore them. A tribunal decision may 
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be set aside if it is made solely with reference to a prescription in a guideline, and 
made in spite of a request to deviate from that prescription. On the other hand, 
where there are guidelines, it may be a breach of the duty of fairness for the 
tribunal member to ignore those guidelines without providing reasons for doing 
so. 
Whether a guideline is an impermissible fetter on the decision-making 
authority of a tribunal member depends on many factors, including the language 
of the guideline, the effect of the guideline, and the needs of the particular tribunal 
itself. In general, the language of the guideline will be a more important factor 
than its effect. 
 
(e) Institutional Decision-Making Processes 
A tribunal may establish internal processes whereby a group of tribunal 
members— often all members — will consider and comment on the draft 
decisions of individual members or panels in advance of the release of those 
decisions. One of the purposes of such processes is to ensure that ―lone-ranger‖ 
tribunal members, who ―conceive of themselves as occupying islands of justice 
within a tribunal‘s office‖, are not able to create a situation where the outcome of 
an appeal or application is different depending on which tribunal member hears it 
(Ellis, 2009). 
Where there is such institutional review, adherence to the principle of 
deliberative secrecy will permit interaction between the members who have heard 
the case and those who have not. The principle of deliberative secrecy is 
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necessary in the tribunal context because it allows the members to deliberate in 
secret, enabling the institutional consultative process, and therefore enhancing 
consistency and predictability. 
 
(f) Clustering of Tribunals 
The clustering of tribunals provides an excellent opportunity to harmonize 
Rules of Practice, technology, and case management processes. Tribunal 
clustering is expected to increase the subject matter effectiveness of the individual 
tribunals and lead to greater consistency across the clustered tribunals. First, it 
combats the ad hoc evolution of administrative tribunal systems, which can lead 
to a lack of consistency through ―discontinuities in how individuals‘ legal rights 
are determined‖ and disruption of the flow of knowledge between tribunal 
members themselves (Sossin & Baxter, 2012). Secondly, cross-appointments, 
cross-training and colocation improve subject-matter synergies, and recognize and 
emphasize the importance of common high standards of adjudicative practices 
(Gottheil & Ewart, 2010). In addition, clustering permits possible innovations that 
may improve the quality and consistency of decision-making on merits reviews 
(Sossin & Baxter, 2012). Such changes in tribunal operation in order to improve 
consistency of tribunal decision-making should be careful to take into account any 
desire to preserve a tribunal‘s distinct identity or culture. 
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(g) Culture of Consistency 
The creation of a culture among tribunal members which values and seeks 
consistency is likely the most durable while also the most difficult to create. Such 
a culture should both foster continuous improvement across the organization and 
lead tribunal members to share a common understanding of the range of 
acceptable views on significant issues of procedure, law and policy (Whitaker, 
Gottheil, & Uhlmann, 2007). In keeping with most of the other tools for 
enhancing consistency, methods to foster a culture of consistency are, as stated, 
generally more ―practical‖ than ―legal‖. 
 Interaction Between Members 
Casual interaction and exchange of ideas are encouraged in open 
office environments. Also, the establishment and reinforcement of best 
practices are aided during regular meetings for geographically disparate 
tribunal members. In a sense, the chairpersons in a tribunal would be given 
the opportunity for private conferences and consultations with the 
associates. 
 New Member Recruitment 
The process of member recruitment or adding new memberships in 
the tribunal is a crucial mechanism in creating a culture of consistency. 
The candidate‘s aptitude and proficiency to complement the tribunal‘s 
internal culture and his understanding of the relevant issues of law and 
policy is assessed during recruitment.  
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 Member Training 
A notable tool for achieving consistency is member training, which 
must be done in the preliminaries and it must be continuing.  Greater 
consistency will result from the creation of programs that regularly train 
the members collectively (Gottheil & Ewart, 2010). The designation of 
training officers, a combination of in-class and applied teaching, and 
offering constant direction and support, may also be considered 
(Goodman, 2011). 
 Monitoring of Member Performance 
What good does the training of decision-makers have if their 
performance is not monitored? The sum total of a tribunal member‘s 
performance can be determined and reflected by the standards of his 
decisions, together with their decision‘s homogeneity with other members‘ 
decisions. Provisions which confer on the chair of a tribunal responsibility 
for supervision of performance may permit the chair to develop codes of 
conduct with professional and ethical responsibilities and with 
performance standards (Mullan, 2009). 
 Review by Tribunal Counsel of Draft Decisions 
The supervision of the members of a tribunal as an instrument for 
boosting consistency in decision-making needs to concentrate more on the 
pronouncements themselves instead of the members individually. A 
tribunal counsel may be employed to control the quality of decisions 
drafted by a tribunal. The evaluation of rough copies of pronouncements 
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looks for consistency and an assessment of the applied laws and 
jurisprudence (Chiasson, 2001).  
 Decision Writing 
In the drafting of decisions or of the reasons behind such 
pronouncements, guiding principles for writing designs, manners of 
articulation, and structuring of the draft will facilitate decision-makers in 
making an allowances for consistency. Moreover, a culture of consistency 
can be achieved and stimulated by the dissemination of draft decisions by 
members and commentaries derived from dialogues and consultations. 
 Case Management and Case Treatment Patterns 
The identical or parallel routes by which analogous cases accede to 
are considered as case treatment patterns. These configurations and 
formations, together with customary case administration, can assist in 
heightening consistency both directly and indirectly by implying the 
tribunal‘s bated breath for control and timetabling of cases (Whitaker, 
Gottheil, & Uhlmann, 2007). 
 
5.4 Political Systems Theory and Institutionalism 
It is important to note as well that the existing policies currently being 
adopted by the Office of the Ombudsman are prompted by the Political Systems 
Theory and Institutionalism.  
Easton (1965) describes a political system as a societal configuration of 
recognizable and interdepended organizations and undertakings that yield 
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commanding or imposing allotments of decisions that are binding on society. 
Outlying the boundaries of a political system, the social order encompass several 
other trends and occurrences such as the collective structures, the economic 
layouts, and the ecological set-up. With this is mind, no less than prudence 
suggests that the political system can be abstracted from all the other modules or 
units of a society. Society provides inputs into the political system in the form of 
demands and supports.  
Demands are regarded as the assertions and entitlements that individuals 
and groups portray to satiate their concerns and trepidations. The responses to 
these demands are to be interpreted as supports. Support is provided when the 
members of society conform or adhere to the laws, rules, and regulations that are 
constituted by the political system. The measure of legitimacy, authority and 
enforceability of support is gauged by the quantity and expanse of support that a 
society confers to a political system.  
Laws, rules, processes, and decisions are considered to be the outputs of 
the political system. These outputs represent a political system‘s public policy. 
The countenance of responses and criticisms to these outputs suggests that public 
policies modify the affairs within a society along with the resulting demands, as 
well as the nature and disposition of the political system itself. Stated differently, 
a new demand may be produced by a policy output, which in turn paves the way 
for more outputs, in an infinite cycle of public policy.  
The expediency of systems theory in the study of public policy is 
constrained by its exceedingly broad and nonfigurative nature. Furthermore, it 
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does not explicate the methods and systems by which decisions are made and 
policy is established within the spectrum of the political system (Anderson, 2003). 
As such, political systems theory portrays the situation where the government 
merely responds to demands made upon it, and the outcomes can be branded as an 
"input-output studies" (Anderson, 2003).  
On the other hand, institutionalism concerns the study of government 
institutions or organizations. The life of politics is largely influenced by 
governmental institutions such as legislative, executive, and judicial branches of 
the government, in concert with political parties. This collective body of 
government institutions commandingly determines and implements public 
policies. Introspections on the formal and legal configuration of government 
institutions have been the focus of traditional approaches in institutionalism which 
includes procedural rules, purposes or undertakings, legal sovereignties, and their 
formal structure. Hardly have studies been concerned in the way or by what 
means institutions virtually operate, neither have there been any diagnostics on the 
public policies generated by the institutions nor any findings of the relationships 
between institutional structure and public policies. In contrast, there abound a 
considerable number of scholarships on how institutions were supposed to 
operate. Consequently, political scientists spun their interest to the political 
procedures transpiring in the interior of governmental or political institutions. 
These studies centered the participants‘ comportment and on political realities 
instead of formalism. In the study of the legislatures, interest shifted from simply 
describing the legislature as an institution to analyzing and explaining its 
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operation over time, from its static to its dynamic aspects. Thus in the academic 
curriculum the course on the legislature often came to be about the legislative 
process (Anderson, 2003).  
Policy analysis could very well engage the principles of institutionalism, 
particularly with its accentuation on the formal or structural characteristics of 
institutions. An institution is, in part, a set of regularized patterns of human 
behavior that persist over time and perform some significant social function or 
activity. It is their differing patterns of behavior that really distinguish courts from 
legislatures, from administrative agencies, and so on. These regularized patterns 
of behavior, which we often call rules or structures, can affect decision-making 
and the content of public policy. Rules and structural arrangements are usually not 
neutral in their effects; rather, they tend to favor some interests in society over 
others and some policy results over others. It is contended that some of the Senate 
rules (and traditions, which often have the effect of rules), such as those relating 
to unlimited debate and action by unanimous consent, favor the interests of 
legislative minorities over majorities. Many actions in the Senate, such as bringing 
bills up for consideration and closing off debate on them, are done by unanimous 
consent. Thus one senator, so inclined, can block action by the Senate (Anderson, 
2003).  
Institutional structures, arrangements, and procedures often have important 
consequences for the adoption and content of public policies. They provide part of 
the context for policymaking, which must be considered along with the more 
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dynamic aspects of politics, such as political parties, groups, and public opinion, 
in policy study (Anderson, 2003). 
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CHAPTER 6 
 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
 A theory that describes a pattern of behavior which is germane to those 
involved is the objective of a grounded theory study (Backman & Kyngäs, 1999, 
p. 151). A theory, on the other hand, is described as a set of suggestions with 
reference to the relationship among several concepts (Rice & Ezzy, 2000, p. 11). 
The grounded theory method was favored in this research on account of its 
capability to generate theory that could be used and be an aid in understanding of 
the concept of concurrence of jurisdiction with particular reference to the 
adjudication of administrative cases by the OMB-MOLEO, considering that no 
previous study had been made on this context. Given that the principle of 
engendering a theory is to explicate an occurrence or an observable fact, the 
relationships that were realized among the categories and their subcategories 
ought to be discussed. These relationships are what Glaser & Strauss (1967) calls 
―hypotheses‖ which are followed by a model that may well be deemed as a 
graphic illustration of all the rudiments of this grounded theory – the core 
theoretical variable, the categories and their corresponding subcategories. 
 
6.2 Hypotheses 
 The core theoretical variable is regarded as the nucleus of the theory and 
must rationalize or justify most of the ―variations‖ in the process of the research 
(Stern, Allen, & Moxley, 1984, p. 379). Glaser (2002, p. 15) portrays the core 
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theoretical variable as the kind of category that settles or resolves affairs and 
interests by organizing all of the other categories. It parks itself at the epicenter of 
the data, and is linked to all the other categories. The core theoretical variable 
must also justify the differences and disparities between and among the other 
categories. To boot, Stern et al. (1984) emphasizes that the core variable should be 
orderly and easy to comprehend.  
 The process of finding a variable that transcended the different categories 
proved to be challenging. Many times, a researcher may run into the phase where 
a grounded theory novice becomes exhausted and disenchanted with the 
categories and their seeming incapacity to iron out the data (Backman & Kyngäs, 
1999, p. 151). Nevertheless, a constant evaluation of the practices involved in 
controlling all the stimuli and impetuses on the concurrence of jurisdiction in the 
adjudication of administrative cases resolved into a social process which, in this 
research, is termed Crossing Boundaries. This variable consists of the word 
‗Cross‘ which, when used as a verb means to pass, move, or reach from one side 
or spot to another. As an adjective, it means extending over or treating several 
groups, conditions, or classes. Crossing is an important point to consider in 
wanting to express the crux within the concept of concurrence in jurisdiction in 
that it is collaborative or concerted. The other part of this core variable is the word 
‗Boundary‘, which when used as a noun, simply means a point or limit that 
indicates where two things become different. This concept is equally as important 
since it serves to exemplify the facets observed in the processes and procedures 
employed by the OMB-MOLEO in the conduct of adjudications in administrative 
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cases. With these two concepts combined – Crossing Boundaries – they form the 
core variable. 
 The model that follows is a representative of the theory, crossing 
boundaries, grounded in the data taken from GIPOs of the OMB-MOLEO 
involving the concurrence of jurisdiction in the adjudication of administrative 
cases. Cognizant of the fact that grounded theories are readily modifiable, a claim 
on the theory of crossing boundaries as being complete cannot be maintained. In 
accord with Glaser and Strauss (1967), ―the published word is not the final one, 
but only a pause in the never ending process of generating theory.‖ 
 
6.3 Theoretical Framework 
 Crossing boundaries developed as the dominant idea that characterizes the 
involvements of the GIPOs of the OMB-MOLEO. Crossing boundaries was 
selected as the core theoretical variable for the following reasons: 
a) it is pivotal, as it can be correlated with the other theoretical 
categories;  
b) it is widely referenced in the data;  
c) it expounds on the theoretical make-up of the phenomena at 
issue; and  
d) it is conceptually adequate to support supplementary studies in 
other significant areas associated to the concurrence of 
jurisdiction in administrative cases.  
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The figure presented below represents the primary components of the theoretical 
framework on the concurrence of jurisdiction in the adjudication of administrative 
cases. 
  
In the sections that follow, each of these categories is discussed where the 
contribution of the theoretical variable to the theoretical framework is outlined. 
 
6.4 Monitoring 
 Monitoring is concomitant to the political systems theory through the issue 
on implementation.  The implementation of decisions issued by the OMB-
MOLEO in administrative cases is one of the identifiable political processes that 
are binding and obligatory to the society. The political systems theory could very 
well be considered as the economics of public administration, such that demands 
for the satisfaction of individual or organizational interests and values are met by 
providing impermeable decisions in administrative cases and laying out a 
schematized sequence of actions. As a consequence and in keeping with the 
Figure 6.3 Theoretical Framework 
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political systems theory, the monitoring of the decisions issued by the OMB-
MOLEO in administrative cases should be held with the highest import.   
 The lack of technical human resources to validate the status of cases 
referred or endorsed to the different government agencies proves to be one of the 
hindrances for the creation of an effective monitoring system. The total personnel 
compliment of the OMB-MOLEO based on the Plantilla of Positions as of 31 
December 2012 is 100. This number is comprised of lawyers, investigators, and 
technical and other support staff, each of whom are given specific responsibilities 
as defined in their job description. Hence, any other additional tasks to be 
assigned in order to compensate for the lack of a monitoring body are added 
responsibilities to the already loaded duties being performed by each personnel. 
These added functions could undeniably have a bearing on the efficient discharge 
of duties and responsibilities to the detriment of the public‘s interests. It is by this 
notion that the lack of human resources impinge on the theoretical category of 
monitoring. 
 Data showing the statistics and figures with reference to the 
implementation of the decisions issued by the OMB-MOLEO is in short supply, 
and if at all, extant. Conformity reports or compliance records of the Orders for 
preventive suspensions and other administrative sanctions or penalties are not 
maintained by the OMB-MOLEO. There is no active measure to ascertain the 
observance and execution of the decisions issued by the OMB-MOLEO in 
administrative cases. The monitoring aspect of decisions issued in administrative 
cases could well be instrumental in acquiring information that indicates the 
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effectivity quotients of compliances, which in turn would allow for the application 
and enactment of conduits that propagates effective, relevant and recognized 
decisions.  
 As a mechanism for ensuring the actual and unbiased implementation of 
decisions, the theoretical category of monitoring represents one of the brittle gears 
reeling the clock of good governance. Monitoring is one of the instruments to be 
used in crossing the boundaries between implementation and concurrence of 
jurisdiction. 
 
6.5 Coordination 
 Reaching a bottleneck from the stream of administrative cases filed in the 
OMB-MOLEO is rather inevitable. Considering the number of GIPOs conducting 
multifarious functions in the management and disposition of criminal and 
administrative cases, coupled with the interminable influx of complaints against 
erring officers and employees of the PNP and other law enforcement offices, it is 
not at all surprising that one GIPO would have his case dockets clogged by 
pending cases. The clogging of case dockets in the OMB-MOLEO signifies two 
things. First, there is a need to speed up the process of adjudication, either through 
the modification of the staffing patterns within the adjudication bureau or the 
allocation of additional GIPOs that conduct adjudication on administrative cases. 
Second, there is a need to screen cases that are being docketed. The screening 
process could very well be from within the organization itself or from the different 
agencies operating under the cloak of concurrent jurisdiction. The bridging of this 
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gap in administrative adjudication proceedings can be settled through coordination 
mechanisms.  
 The propensity of complainants to file multiple complaints based on the 
same cause of action and seeking for the same reliefs can be avoided through the 
implementation of stringent means of coordination. The filing of multiple suits 
arising from a single set of facts resulting to the issuance of decisions that may 
altogether be contradictory vitiates the credibility and integrity of these decisions 
and the offices that they represent. In order to preclude the frequency of this 
incidence, coordination between and among the different adjudicating bodies is 
imperative. 
 Limiting the scope of jurisdiction in administrative cases also need to be 
coordinated. It should be borne in mind that the introduction and promulgation of 
rules that bind and affect agencies in the government should be specifically 
authorized and must be consistent with their respective constating statute.   
 The processes, procedures and the acumen to issue decisions in 
administrative cases need to be harmonized. The synchronization of these issues 
can best be portrayed under the theoretical category of coordination.  
 
6.6 Consistency 
 Drawing on the rules of procedure of other administrative adjudicating 
tribunals in the conduct of adjudication is completely acceptable and tolerable, 
much so when these rules of procedure apply by and large to the government in 
the effective management of its affairs. However, when these set of rules differ in 
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a way that an application of another would impinge on the integrity of the other, 
then a problem on consistency would evolve. The discrepancies in the application 
of these rules may not advance to a particular instant of total disparity, but to a 
certain extent, they impose punishments at a different expanse and degree.   
The incongruous decisions from different adjudicating bodies and within 
the organization itself, where the likeliness of its occurrence on no account must 
be ignored, can nevertheless be prevented.  Conflicting decisions arise because 
there is no uniform process in place to adhere to. Moreover, apart from the matter 
of processes and procedures, the decision-making aspect in administrative 
adjudications is subjective in nature. Discretion, preference and foresight are 
affairs that cannot be measured or even be placed under the clout of dominion, 
thus, the need for coordinated actions to at least diminish the incidence of 
discrepancies and contradictions. 
 
6.7 The Theoretical Variable 
 When rolled into one, the three theoretical categories constitute the core 
theoretical variable of crossing boundaries. The theoretical categories of 
monitoring, coordination and consistency are the frames by which the conduct of 
administrative adjudication are being effected or performed. On their own, each of 
these categories signifies the ambiguities that need to be considered in improving 
and enhancing the concurrence of jurisdiction in the adjudication of administrative 
cases. Each of these categories may be operative and functional on their own and 
may produce the desired results, but when bridged together, they form a 
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methodical process that ensures mannerly adherence to procedures resulting to 
efficiency in the conduct of governmental functions, specifically those that relate 
to the adjudication of administrative cases. 
The boundaries established in this research could be recognized in two 
aspects. When viewed from within, the boundaries could pertain to the internal 
rules, procedures and processes among the GIPOs or the different bureaus 
operating within the OMB-MOLEO. When regarded in the external concept, 
boundaries could mean the peripheries of inter-agency relations with particular 
regard to adjudicating tribunals and their sets of rules and procedures. 
The crossing of boundaries then means the alignment of certain aspects of 
procedures between and among the players in the field of administrative 
adjudication. The configurations, patterns and designs defining the relationship of 
the different adjudicating bodies form viaducts that conjoin one tribunal to another 
in terms of policies and guidelines.  
 
6.8 The Crossing of Boundaries 
 The core theoretical variable of crossing boundaries embraces the three 
other theoretical categories. Together, the theoretical categories represent the 
qualities of the schemes employed by the OMB-MOLEO that are crucial for the 
fluid operation of administrative adjudication processes taken in the context of 
concurrence in jurisdiction. The theoretical categories are, in this research, the 
boundaries that limit or constrain the activities undertaken in the adjudication of 
administrative cases. It is worthy to note that the idea of boundaries has been at 
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the fulcrum of significant and leading investigation designs in the areas of 
sociology, political science, anthropology, history, and psychology (Lamont & 
Molnar, 2002). Also, the idea of boundaries has become associated with scholarly 
work in cognition, social and collective identity, commensuration, census 
categories, cultural capital, cultural membership, racial and ethnic group 
positioning, hegemonic masculinity, professional jurisdiction, scientific 
controversies, group rights, immigration, and contentious politics (Lamont & 
Molnar, 2002).  
 The initial consideration of the categories suggested the kind of 
relationship that the OMB-MOLEO adjudication bureau has with its counterparts 
in the adjudication bodies of other law enforcement offices with adjudicatory 
powers. In reflecting how the theoretical categories are interrelated, it became 
evident that the theoretical categories spoke to the ways in which social actors 
conceptualize and categorize people, practices, perception of realities and 
symbolic resources (Lamont & Molnar, 2002). The theoretical categories then, 
were descriptive of the relational process at play in the interface between the 
different administrative adjudication bodies and within the adjudication bureau of 
the OMB-MOLEO itself.  
 The theory of crossing boundaries attempts to protect the integrity of 
individual institutions while at the same time, realizing the unity and oneness of 
policies, processes and procedures. From an inside perspective, the different 
adjudicating bodies are bound within the confines of their own zones that they: a) 
sometimes neglect to reach out and systematize the processes and procedures 
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(coordination); b) tend to work on their individual duties that they overlook 
important aspects (monitoring); and, c) fail to compare notes with and consult 
other offices (consistency). This concept may not be new or novel, but it is 
something that is exceedingly focal and influential. The crossing of boundaries 
posits the realization that the processes attendant to the different adjudicating 
bodies with concurrent jurisdiction are not separate, instead, they represent a 
manifestation of the larger whole.  
 The core theoretical variable established in this study can be regarded as 
the true symbol of the issues involved in the adjudication of administrative cases 
in the Office of the Ombudsman for the MOLEO. The office has been struggling 
to find the real roots of the problems or issues it has been facing in connection 
with the concurrence of its jurisdiction with the different administrative tribunals. 
The failure to understand the factual concepts encountered in this study has 
ultimately affected the kind of approaches that the office has in the adjudication of 
administrative cases.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
 The theory that has been generated in this research has been discussed in 
Chapter 6 and the narratives therein have, in essence, concluded the study. 
However, the purpose of grounded theory is to create theory as a starting point for 
discussion, research and action. Grounded theory is especially helpful in areas 
where little research exists because it casts a wide net out from inductively 
reasoned theoretical categories to points of connection with other lines of research 
and established theory. As such, the limitations of this study, the implications of 
the research, suggestions from the study, and final remarks are presented in this 
final chapter. 
 
7.2 Limitations  
 As with any other research, this study is limited in certain ways. This 
research must be viewed in light of the foregoing. First, it is acknowledged that 
methods that involve verbal reports, such as interviews, share a problem with 
accuracy in that the researcher is dependent on the participant‘s ability to 
articulate and recall events related to the research. Second, this research is 
dependent upon the researcher‘s ability to provide theoretical sensitivity to the 
data gathered. Third, this research focuses on the generation of a theory, not in the 
testing of previously generated theories or hypotheses regarding jurisdiction and 
the concurrence thereof in administrative adjudications. Fourth, since the study 
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involved the administrative adjudication being conducted in OMB-MOLEO, all 
participants were GIPOs of the same office, a different group of GIPOs or 
adjudicators from other offices or agencies could produce different results. Fifth, a 
considerable reference to the PNP-IAS has been made as compared to the 
administrative adjudicating bodies of other law enforcement offices because of the 
volume of cases being handled by both OMB-MOLEO and PNP-IAS. Moreover, 
a greater part of the cases being handled by the OMB-MOLEO pertains to 
members of the PNP.  Finally, the interview data set from which the theoretical 
categories were derived was small. While the requirement of theoretical saturation 
was met, engaging in a larger extent of participants could produce more 
theoretical categories resultant from the interviews. The sample taken from the 
GIPOs of the OMB-MOLEO was one of convenience. 
 
7.3 Implications of this research 
 One of the implications evident in this research is that this research 
contributes to the isolation and conceptualization of the issues involved in the 
adjudication of administrative cases in the OMB-MOLEO specifically that of 
administrative cases involving the concurrence of jurisdiction with other 
administrative adjudicating bodies of law enforcement offices. As such, this 
theoretical research serves to add to the earlier body of knowledge regarding 
concurrence of jurisdiction in the adjudication of administrative cases.  
 The theoretical categories that developed as an outcome of this study 
represent the bounds by which the adjudication of administrative cases in the 
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OMB-MOLEO is constrained with. The theoretical categories and the resultant 
core variable emphasizes the need for gauging and reconsidering actions and 
measures that need to be undertaken in attempting to improve the manners and 
methods relating to the adjudication of administrative cases. The theoretical 
categories are the fissures that curtail the merits and practicality of administrative 
adjudication processes. Given that the concepts which developed from this 
research have been rooted from the actual actors in the field of administrative 
adjudication, it is of the essence to note the soundness and cogency of the results. 
Further studies in the areas of monitoring, coordination and consistency in 
administrative adjudication proceedings may bring about colossal transformations 
in the understanding, awareness and responses to and effectivity and efficiency of 
administrative proceedings. 
This research offers a mild substantial theory on the concurrence of 
jurisdiction of the OMB-MOLEO with the other administrative tribunals of law 
enforcement offices in the adjudication of administrative cases. As such, it is a 
good starting point for further inquiry. While there had been limitations to this 
work, there also had been established abundant prospects for extensive inquiries 
and scholarly activities. 
 
7.4 Suggestions for further research 
 While this research provides a validated substantial grounded theory 
revolving around the concurrence of jurisdiction in the adjudication of 
administrative cases, this research likewise opens the floodgates of extended 
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inquiries. The following areas of discussion and research are suggested to be 
undertaken relative to the concurrence of jurisdiction in the adjudication of 
administrative cases being handled by the Office of the Ombudsman: 
1) This study focused on the perspectives of GIPOs of the OMB-MOLEO 
and did not study the perspectives of the adjudicators of the law 
enforcement agencies with concurrent jurisdiction. In this context, 
administrative adjudication has yet to be studied from this standpoint. 
2) This study is descriptive in nature as it intended to generate theory rather 
than test an existing one. A more empirically based approach may be taken 
to measure the perceptions of adjudicators who handle administrative 
cases and the concepts, theory and ideas from this study may be 
subsequently used in developing a survey tool for this purpose.  
3) An empirical approach may be initiated to ascertain the aspects that could 
be potentially used for understanding and further developing the guidelines 
for monitoring, coordination and consistency of administrative decisions. 
4) A long term study could be undertaken to measure the impact, efficiency 
and effectiveness of the theoretical concepts generated in this research. 
5) An exploratory study may be piloted to discover issues related to policy-
making and implementation processes in the Office of the Ombudsman 
and/or in any of its sectoral offices.  
6) Additional studies can include preliminary investigation on criminal cases. 
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7.5 Personal Reflections 
This study intends to foster the groundwork in understanding of the state 
of the OMB-MOLEO‘s administrative adjudicatory function. At the heart of this 
theme, the need for a broader comprehension on the effects of its procedures, 
powers and functions – in relation to the other adjudicating tribunals – is a 
requisite component that should be particularized so that a deeper appreciation of 
matters relating to inter-agency relations would be realized. Also, it is assumed 
that this study would be able to provide insights into the current inter-agency 
policies that are indispensable for the OMB-MOLEO and the other administrative 
adjudicating bodies to successfully carry out the ends of social justice and to 
advance an effective and competent government. In this light, I find it appropriate 
to end this study with an excerpt that suitably sums up the concurrence of 
jurisdiction in the adjudication of administrative cases with particular reference to 
the three main categories that evolved during the conduct of this research. In the 
words of Martin Landau (1969): 
―In public administration the standard policy for improving 
the performance characteristics of an administrative agency has 
rested upon the classical axiom that the reliability and efficiency of 
an operating system, man or ma- chine, is dependent on the 
reliability and efficiency of each of its parts, including linkages. 
Improvement, therefore, calls for a system to be broken down 
(decomposed or analyzed) into its most basic units, these to be 
worked on to the point of infallibility. So much success has 
attended this procedure, especially as regards machine-based 
systems, that it not only constitutes a sound problem-solving 
paradigm, but is often generalized into a good commonsense rule. 
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About the only limitations which are imposed on its application are 
those which derive from market conditions, the law of diminishing 
returns, and the state of the art.‖ 
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Appendix 1 Subcategory Development: Lack of Technical human 
resources 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 Subcategory Development: Non-implementation 
 
 
 
Focused Coding
(Subcategory Development)
We lack manpower. Cry for help
Burden-sharing
Uneven distribution of cases
Less people
Need for reinforcement
Technical job
Limited hiring of technical staff
Less people but more job
Overwhelmed workforce
Supervision of issued 
decisions needed
Lack of feedback
Just add more people, it's that simple
Strengthen quantity of 
workforce
Text from the interviews Open Coding
Lack of technical human 
resources
I hope they expand our workforce soon.
Concurrence is a good thing, our workload could at least be lessened
Only a handful of persons do the work, and that is one of the reasons for 
the delays.
Considering the shortage of lawyers conducting adjudication, there is no 
one to pull-out to conduct monitoring.
I don't personally know if the Decisions I have issued over the years have 
all been carried out.
Focused Coding
(Subcategory Development)
Supervision of issued 
decisions needed
Lack of feedback
Feeling of weakness
Vulnerability of decision 
making process
Slim prospect for confirmation
Awareness by chance
Toothless tiger
Disregard of decisions
Disregard of decisions
Awareness by chance
Indifference to decision-
making power
Text from the interviews Open Coding
Non-implementation
I sometimes hear news from my friends in the PNP that orders for 
suspension are not being effected.
When I had a lecture at the PNP, I was shocked to know that one officer 
reports to work even after a decision was issued suspending him from the 
service.
I don't personally know if the Decisions I have issued over the years have 
all been carried out.
Wouldn't it bother you if your Decisions are not being implemented?
I would only learn of the respondent's receipt of the Decision once they 
file for a Motion for Reconsideration.
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Appendix 3 Subcategory Development: Lack of data 
 
 
 
Appendix 4 Subcategory Development: Impact 
 
 
 
Appendix 5 Subcategory Development: Clogging of Case Dockets 
 
Focused Coding
(Subcategory Development)
Data like that exists before, I just don't know why it was discontinued.
Data collection previously 
done
Inconcistencies in data
Variation in data collection
Data maintenance
Uncomplicated 
Want of personnel
Text from the interviews Open Coding
Lack of data
We have some statistics, but sometimes, our (OMB-MOLEO) figures 
don't match the figures of the Central Office.
The generation of data is a mechanical act; it is just a matter of adding up 
numbers. The problem is, no one is available to do it.
Focused Coding
(Subcategory Development)
Feeling of weakness
Vulnerability of decision 
making process
Ethical considerations
Moral considerations
Doubts and misgivings
Skepticism
Meticulous work
Well thought out decisions
Text from the interviews Open Coding
Impact
When drafting decisions, you have to think about the effects that your 
Decision may have to the respondent's job and family.
Often do you hear people asking if the persons found guilty of an offense 
are really and actually disciplined.
I think of every detail when I pen a Decision, and that consumes much of 
my time.
Wouldn't it bother you if your Decisions are not being implemented?
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Appendix 6 Subcategory Development: Infringement of Power 
 
 
 
Appendix 7 Subcategory Development: Conflicting Decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Focused Coding
(Subcategory Development)
To my mind, this would result to an infringement on the power vested 
upon the OMB and PNP by law.
Encroachment of power
I know about the existence of the MOA [Memorandum of Agreement], 
but the provisions therein are hardly ever followed.
Enforcement difficulties
Selective 
Partiality
Text from the interviews Open Coding
Infringement of Power
That is feasible, however, not only do we have concurrent jurisdiction with 
the PNP, but also with other adjudicating bodies.
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Appendix 8 Subcategory Development: Verification 
 
 
 
Appendix 9 Subcategory Development: Borrowed Rules of 
Procedure 
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Appendix 10 Subcategory Development: Discretion 
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Appendix 11 Category Development: Monitoring 
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Appendix 12 Category Development: Coordination 
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Appendix 13 Category Development: Consistency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Focused Coding Axial Coding
(Subcategory Development) (Category Development)
I have already asked that before, and they told me that the rules are under 
way, and that was years ago.
Need to expedite rules 
construction
I use the CSC rules as there are a lot of cases available on SCRA 
[Supreme Court Reports Annotated].
Recourse to alternatives
Irreconcilability
Variation in rules
Uninformed judgment
Misinterpretation of laws
I do come across issuing different Decisions for the same offense, as the 
decision is contingent upon the facts.
Differing circumstances
I sometimes take into account 'humanitarian considerations'. Moral implications
Doubt
Hesitation 
Uncertainty
I have previously attended trainings for the issuance of Decisions. Acquired knowledge
Option
Preference
Poles apart
Diversity
Diversity
Wide range of undertanding
Personal preference
Predeliction
Text from the interviews Open Coding
Borrowed Rules of Procedure
Discretion
ConsistencyWhy is it different?
I often cite the SCRA as my reference.
I overheard some GIPOs talking once, they were discussing within 
themselves as to why my appreciation of the case is different.
We all have differing interpretations.
Here's the thing, if we both see an apple, you may say that the apple is 
small and heart-shaped, but for me, it is a medium sized apple that is tooth-
shaped.
I often ask myself, why is the penalty lower in the PNP rules?
It depends. Sometimes, the complainant himself would designate the 
offense.
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Appendix 14 Theory Generation 
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